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ABSTRACT 
Environmental protection has not traditionally represented an area of concern for banks 
and other lending institutions. However, several provisions of the Resource 
Management Act 1991, namely sections 314(1)(da) and 322(1)(b)(ii), have the potential 
to impose liability on certain parties to clean up contamination of the environment, 
irrespective of whether the party was responsible for causing the contamination. 
Liability attracts under these sections simply on the basis that a person constitutes an 
"owner" or "occupier" of land. In certain circumstances, lenders may qualify as 
owners or occupiers of land, thereby exposing themselves to liability under the Act. 
Environmental issues are therefore acquiring a great deal of importance for lending 
institutions in this country. 
This paper examines exactly how the potential for lender liability arises under the 
Resource Management Act. The paper then analyses, from a Law and Economics 
perspective, whether such liability can be justified as a matter of principle or policy. 
The paper argues that lender liability is largely incapable of achieving the goals of 
environmental law (namely, the efficient allocation of resources, and a fair distribution 
of loss) and that therefore, its continued existence cannot be justified. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 15,193 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Contamination of land, air and water is an increasing problem in New Zealand, as it is 
around the world. Remediation of contaminated sites can be a costly and protracted 
exercise. If states decide to remediate or clean up contaminated sites, it becomes 
necessary for them to determine who should pay for the costs of remediation. The 
issue of financial liability is particularly contentious where the responsible party cannot 
be identified or is insolvent. 
The Resource Management Act 1991 ('RMA' or 'the Act') provides the legal 
framework for addressing that issue in New Zealand. Through the mechanisms of 
enforcement orders and abatement notices, the RMA imposes liability on certain parties 
for the costs of cleaning up contaminated sites. Enforcement orders and abatement 
notices are normally directed against the person responsible for creating the adverse 
environmental effect. However, in certain circumstances they can be used to impose 
liability for clean-up costs on t)1ird parties who are not responsible for causing the 
pollution. 
This paper is concerned with the liability of one of these groups: lenders. Under the 
RMA, lending institutions such as banks and finance companies, or secured creditors 
generally, are exposed to open-ended environmental liability if they take steps to 
enforce their security or are too closely involved in the management of their borrower's 
business. In this way, lenders can effectively be held liable for the environmentally 
unsound activities of their borrowers. 
Debate on the topic of lender liability in New Zealand has so far been sparse. The little 
that has been written is often unstructured and emotive. This paper attempts to examine 
the concept of lender liability in a systematic way in order to ascertain whether this form 
of liability can be justified. Part II of the paper will briefly discuss the nature and scope 
of the environmental problem in New Zealand, while Part III provides an overview of 
the relevant enforcement provisions of the RMA. Part IV will explore exactly how the 
potential for lender liability arises under the RMA provisions, both directly and 
indirectly. This will entail a comparison with lender liability provisions of foreign 
jurisdictions. Having demonstrated that lenders could be held liable under the RMA, 
the paper will then examine whether the courts are likely to impose liability on lenders 
in practice. 
The paper will then analyse whether, in principle, courts should impose liability on 
lenders for the actions of their borrowers. The paper attempts to answer this question 
6 
using what is essentially a Law and Economics approach. This paper is premised on 
the assumption that economic theory can assist in analysing the merits of particular legal 
rules such as lender liability. Such an approach is especially useful in analysing 
environmental issues given that, at its core, pollution is an economic problem. Using 
an economic approach, the paper will explore whether lender liability is successful in 
achieving the goals of environmental law (namely, the efficient allocation of resources, 
and a fair distribution of risk or loss). This involves examining what incentives are 
created when pollution costs are placed on lenders as opposed to other groups in 
society. What are the distributional effects of allocating risk to lenders? The analysis 
will show that in many respects, lender liability has inefficient and unfair effects, and 
that it is therefore incapable of properly satisfying the goals of environmental law. This 
conclusion suggests that parliament should revisit the policy framework it has adopted 
in theRMA. 
II THE NATURE OF THE ENVIRONMENT AL PROBLEM 
A What is Site Contamination ? 
Soil and ground water contamination historically results from the manufacture, storage 
and disposal of non-naturally occurring hazardous substances such as polychlorinated 
biphenyls, pesticides, cyanides, metals and asbestos. 1 Industries typically associated 
with site contamination include agriculture, airports, railway yards, service stations, 
paint and pharmaceutical manufacture, dry cleaning establishments, iron and steel 
works, and oil production. 2 A site is usually considered contaminated when 
hazardous substances occur in concentrations above background levels. The main 
concern with such contamination is that it can pose an immediate or long term threat to 
human health and the environment. 3 
B Site Contamination Overseas 
Contamination of land and ground water has been a recognised problem for many years 
in Europe and North America. For example, an estimated 2.2 billion metric tons of 
waste is produced annually in Europe. Because of the limited availability of land, there 
is a critical waste disposal capacity which in tum has led to illegal dumping and an 
1 See Ministry for the Environment Potentially Contaminated Sites in New Zealand: A Broad Scale 
Assessment (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 1992), 2.1 - 2.2. 
2 See above n 1, 2.2. 
3 See above n 1, 2.1. Section 344 of the Resource Management Act defines "hazardous substances" as 
substances which may impair human, plant, or animal health. 
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increased need to export waste.4 In the Netherlands alone, over 100,000 sites have 
been identified as being potentially contaminated with an estimated clean up cost of $68 
billion.5 In 1980, the United States Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA') 
estimated that the United States produced 57 million metric tons of hazardous waste per 
year and that 90 percent of this waste was being disposed of in environmentally 
unsound ways. By 1992, 1183 sites had been placed on the US National Priority List, 
a list of the most dangerous sites in the country.6 
C The Problem of Site Contamination in New 'Zealand 
The problem has been recognised in New Zealand only recently. In 1991 the Ministry 
for the Environment commissioned a broad scale assessment of the probable nature, 
extent and severity of the problem of contaminated sites in New Zealand. The resulting 
report7 estimated that New Zealand has approximately 7800 potentially contaminated 
locations8 of which approximately 1580 pose a high risk. The cost of cleaning up the 
high risk sites alone is estimated to be around $620 million, with an additional $1 
billion needed to remediate moderate risk sites.9 
These figures are particularly significant in light of the fact that New Zealand has an 
'environmentally sensitive economy'. New Zealand's economic well-being largely 
depends on its agricultural, horticultural, fishing and forestry industries. The 
international acceptability and marketability of the products of these industries is 
dramatically influenced by the cleanliness of the environment in which they are 
produced. 10 In other words, even small levels of pollution could tarnish the 'clean, 
green' image that New Zealand currently enjoys in overseas markets. New Zealand has 
therefore been forced to become more environmentally sensitive. 
4 HJ Alderman "The Ghost of Progress Past: A Comparison of Approaches to Hazardous Waste 
Liability in the European Community and the United States" (1993) 16 Houston JIL 311, 314. 
5 Above n 1, 2.1. 
6 L J Oswald "Strict Liability of Individuals under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis" (1993) 20 BC 
Envitl Aff L Rev 579, 585-587. 
7 Above n 1. 
8 This figure includes timber treatment sites. See above n 1, 8.1 
9 See above n 1, 8.1. The figures do not include allowance for contamination from orchardists and 
growers, private and farm landfills and sewage treatment plant sludges. The order of accuracy of the 
figures is+/- 50 percent. 
10 See D Clifford in Banking Law Association, Banking Law and Practice 10th Annual Conference, 
13-14 May 1993, Queensland, Australia, 53. 
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III AN OVERVIEW OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT ACT 1991 
Awareness of the importance of environmental issues has led to radical legal reform in 
the shape of the RMA. The Act's overriding purpose is the promotion of sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources. 11 A subsidiary goal, and one which is 
of concern to this paper, is the prevention and remediation of site contamination. The 
RMA contains a number of provisions which are designed to achieve these goals. 
These provisions operate on two levels. 
A Regulation 
At the first level, Part III of the Act sets out a number of duties and restrictions which 
regulate the use of land and water, and the discharge of contaminants into land or 
water. 12 In very general terms, section 9 prevents a person using land in a manner that 
contravenes a district or regional plan. Section 11 prevents the subdivision of land 
unless it is expressly allowed. Sections 12 and 13 restrict the use of coastal marine 
areas, lakes and rivers. Pursuant to section 14, water may not be taken, used, dammed 
or diverted unless it is expressly allowed. No contaminants may be discharged into 
land, air or water without express consent under section 15. Section 17 states that 
every person has a duty to avoid, remedy, or mitigate any adverse effect on the 
environment arising from an activity carried on by that person. 
B Enforcement 
At the second level, the Act provides for the enforcement of these duties and 
restrictions. The enforcement regime of the RMA is contained in Part XII. Two of the 
main enforcement mechanisms in the Act, namely enforcement orders and abatement 
notices, also constitute the primary means of allocating responsibility for remediation of 
contaminated sites. 
11 Section 5 defines "sustainable management" as "managing the use, development, and protection of 
natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide 
for their social, economic, and cultural well being and for their health and safety while -
(a) Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to meet the 
reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems ; and 
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the environment". 
As is evident from section 5, the Act encourages the maintenance of a "biophysical bottom line" and 
"hard environmental standards". See John Milligan "The Resource Management Act - 9 Months On" 
[1992) NZLJ 351. 
12 More detailed rules and duties can be found in Regional and District Plans. 
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Through these two mechanisms, the Act imposes both civil and criminal liability. An 
enforcement order or abatement notice may make a party civilly liable for the costs of 
remedying environmental damage. Failure to comply with such an order or notice is an 
offence that attracts criminal liability under sections 338 and 339. The following 
sections of the paper traverse in greater detail the nature and effect of enforcement 
orders and abatement notices, and the liability attaching to them. 
1 Enforcement orders and abatement notices 
( a) Procedure 
Abatement notices represent a convenient and inexpensive first resort in formal 
enforcement. Abatement notices are meant to be issued like parking offence 
notices, warning a person that he or she is contravening the provisions of the 
Act. 13 They may be served on any person by a duly appointed enforcement 
officer who has reasonable grounds for believing certain circumstances exist. 14 
The abatement notice procedure is generally thought to be less onerous but also 
less effective than enforcement orders. For example, the effectiveness of 
abatement notices is reduced by the strict requirements as to form and content of 
the notice contained in section 324. 15 More importantly, abatement notices are 
ineffective if appealed, as lodgment of a notice of appeal acts as a stay of the 
notice, pending the Planning Tribunal's decision.16 
While only local authorities can issue abatement notices, any person can apply 
to the Planning Tribunal for an enforcement order. 17 Enforcement orders 
represent more serious enforcement action than abatement notices, and often 
follow where abatement notices are appealed or not complied with. 18 It is also 
possible to apply for an interim enforcement order, which may be made ex 
parte, and without holding a hearing. 19 Such orders remain in force until they 
are cancelled, or until an application for an enforcement order proper is 
13 Judge Kenderdine, John Gallen and Royden Somerville, Applications under the Resource 
Management Act 1991 New Zealand Law Society October-November 1993, 92. 
14 Section 322(4) of the RMA. 
l5 See P Milne in Brooker's Resource Management (Brooker's, Wellington, 1991), 3.01. 
16 See above n 15, 3.01; section 325(3) of the RMA. 
17 Section 316(1) of the RMA. However, pursuant to section 316(2) RMA, only a local authority or 
consent authority can apply for an enforcement order of the kind specified in section 314(1)(da) or (e). 
18 Above n 15, ER3.01; above n 13, 92. 
19 Section 320(1) and (2) of the RMA. 
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determined. 20 Interim enforcement orders are therefore very effective 
enforcement tools where urgent action is required.21 
(b) Scope 
Abatement notices and enforcement orders can prohibit, or require cessation, of 
an activity, or they can require positive action. For example, under sections 
314(1)(a) and 322(1)(a), a person can be required to cease doing something that 
contravenes the Act or is noxious, dangerous or offensive to such an extent that 
it has an adverse effect on the environment. Conversely, under sections 
314(1)(b) and (c) and 322(1)(b)(i), an order or notice can be served requiring a 
person to do something that is necessary to ensure compliance with the Act or to 
avoid, remedy or mitigate any adverse effect on the environment caused by or 
on behalf of that person. Clearly, these sections provide an important means of 
combating environmental pollution. Section 314(4) also provides a powerful 
weapon for dealing with .contaminated sites. Under this section an order may 
require the restoration of any natural and physical resource to the state it was in 
before the adverse effect occurred. 
It is interesting to note that an "effect'' is defined in section 3 as including "any 
positive or adverse effect", and "any past, present, or future effect". Past 
effects are not particularly relevant in the area of site contamination. Unless the 
effect is still continuing, there is no point issuing an enforcement order or 
abatement notice. However, it is possible that a person can be held liable to 
remedy a presently occurring adverse effect where the original contamination 
was caused prior to the passing of the RMA. The definition of "environment" 
in section 2 is also of note. It is sufficiently wide that abatement notices or 
enforcement orders could be used to address such diverse matters as adverse 
effects on amenity or property values, and the personal well-being of adjoining 
occupiers.22 The broad scope of these definitions mean the RMA's 
enforcement mechanisms have a potentially pervasive effect. 
20 Section 320(5) of the RMA. 
21 Above n 15, ER7; above n 13, 89. 
22 "Environment" is defined as including "(a) ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people 
and communities ; and (b) all natural and physical resources ; and (c) amenity values ; and (d) the 
social, economic, aesthetic, and cultural conditions which affect the matters stated in paragraphs (a) to 
(c) of this definition or which are affected by those matters". See above n 15, 3.04 ; Montreal v 
Whangarei District Council A83/92 .. 
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2 Compliance and civil liability 
Where an enforcement order or abatement notice is served on a person, that person is 
required, under sections 315 and 323 respectively, to comply with the order or notice 
and pay all the costs and expenses of complying with the order or notice. This 
requirement is complemented by the power in section 314(1)(d): where any person fails 
to comply with an enforcement order or abatement notice, the Planning Tribunal can 
require that person to reimburse other parties for the costs and expenses incurred in 
avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects on the environment. 23 
Furthermore, section 315(2) provides that parties who comply with an enforcement 
order on behalf of the person failing to comply with the order, have powers to enter the 
land, sell or dispose of salvaged materials, and recover any costs as a debt due from 
that person. It is therefore virtually impossible to avoid incurring the costs of 
remediation when an enforcement order or abatement notice has been properly served. 
3 Failure to comply and criminal liability 
In addition, contravention of sections 9 to 15, or failure to comply with an enforcement 
order or abatement notice, is an offence under section 338(1). Section 339(1) provides 
for penalties of imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine not 
exceeding $200,000, and a further fine of $10,000 per day for continuing offences. 
There is also provision for a sentence of community service24 and for the Court to 
make any of the orders under section 314,25 which could include the payment of clean-
up costs. 
The High Court judgment of Machinery Movers Ltd v Auckland Regional Council 26 
sets out the appropriate sentencing principles under the Act. The Court held that the 
penalties imposed by the former Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 have no 
relevance to the RMA. According to Barker and Williams JJ: 27 
The RMA is informed by a wholly different environmental philosophy which places 
far greater emphasis on environmental protection and introduces a much more 
stringent regime of penalties and punishment than did the 1967 Act. 
23 In Auckland City v Sulenta 26 August 1994, A 66/94, the Planning Tribunal held that although it 
could not be drawn from the language of para (d), it was implicit that the adverse effects would have to 
be caused by or on behalf of the defendant. 
24 Section 339(4) of the RMA. 
25 Section 339(5) of the RMA. 
26 (1993) 2 NZRMA 661. 
27 Above n 26, 666, 668 (emphasis added). 
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... these changes constitute a clear legislative direction to the Courts to ensure that 
higher penalties are imposed which will have a significant deterrent quality. 
Hence, defendants can expect more severe penalties under the RMA than previous 
legislation. 
Significantly, the RMA criminal liability provisions adopt what is essentially a strict 
liability regime. Section 341 provides that in any prosecution for a breach of sections 9 
to 15, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant intended to commit the offence. 
The defendant can avoid liability only by proving that the conduct was necessary and 
reasonable in the circumstances or that the event was beyond the control of the 
defendant and was not reasonably foreseeable, and in either case the effects were 
adequately mitigated or remedied by the defendant. 28 
N POTENTIAL FOR LENDER LIABILITY UNDER THE RMA 
Most of the enforcement provisions of the RMA impose liability on the person who 
causes adverse effects on the environment. To this extent the RMA embraces the 
"polluter pays" principle, which holds that those who generate pollution should bear the 
costs of alleviating or containing that pollution.29 However, the Act also provides for 
the power to impose direct liability on, and cause indirect loss or detriment to, third 
parties such as lenders, who have no or little connection, in any causative sense, to the 
offending activity. 
28 Section 341(2)(a) and (b) of the RMA. The subsection reads: 
"(2) ... it is a defence ... if the defendant proves-
(a) That-
(i) The action or event to which the prosecution relates was necessary for the 
purposes of saving or protecting life or health, or preventing serious damage to 
property or avoiding an actual or likely adverse effect on the environment; and 
(ii) The conduct of the defendant was reasonable in the circumstances; and 
(iii) The effects of the action or event were adequately mitigated or remedied by 
the defendant after it occurred; or 
(b) That the action or event to which the prosecution relates was due to an event beyond 
the control of the defendant, including natural disaster, meachanical failure, or sabotage, 
and in each case -
(i) The action or event could not reasonably have been foreseen or been provided 
against by the defendant; and 
(ii) The effects of the action or event were adequately mitigated or remedied by 
the defendant after it occurred." 
Section 341 represents the adoption and codification of the principles contained in Civil Aviation 
Department v MacKenzie [1983] NZLR 78. 
29 Australian and New Zealand Environment and Conservation Council (ANZECC) Financial 
Liability for Contaminated Site Remediation (Canberra. 1993), 14. 
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A Indirect Loss 
Traditionally, it has been the indirect costs of environmental pollution that have 
represented a concern to lenders. Environmental laws impact indirectly on lending 
institutions in two ways. 
1 Decreased value of the security 
The value of the lender's security interest can be affected where environmentally 
hazardous industries are carried out on the property, or where land has already been 
polluted.3° Even the perception of environmental risk can decrease the value of the 
security.31 The Banking Law and Practice Conference quotes an example of an inner-
Sydney industrial site which was found to be contaminated with coke and fly-ash as a 
result of infilling from nearby gas works. The site was unsuitable for residential use 
and required remedial work costing up to $800,000.32 Not only will land such as this 
drop in value, but few parties will be willing to purchase such land and thereby expose 
themselves to liability for its clean-up. The bank may therefore be forced to write off 
its loan or abandon the land. 
2 Effect of environmental liabilities on borrowers 
Further, the impact of the RMA on borrowers' businesses can also indirectly affect 
lenders. Unforeseen environmental costs and liabilities can undermine borrowers' cash 
flow and consequently, their ability to service and repay their loan debts. For example, 
a borrower may be forced to cease profitable but environmentally unsound practices; 
borrowers may be innocent purchasers of contaminated land; borrowers may incur 
fines, clean-up costs, legal costs, not to mention increases in insurance premiums, 
adverse publicity, and closure of facilities.33 All of these factors will undermine the 
strength of the borrower's business and so undermine a lender's security and return on 
its lending. 34 
30 See G Pearce and P Delemarre in above n 10, 48; S McArley "Resource Management Act - Focus 
on the Bankers" (1993) 6 New Zealand Banker 29; C Maher "Lender Liability under the Resource 
Management Act 1991: The Case for the Banks" LLB (Hons) Seminar, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1994, 6. 
31 CM Ward "Environmental Risk Assessment" (1993) llOBLJ 204, 206. 
32 G Pearce and P Delemarre, above n 10, 49. 
33 See above n 29, 48; Maher, above n 30, 6. 
34 McArley, above n 30, 29. 
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Such indirect liability will affect lenders regardless of whether they face direct liability 
under the RMA. In most cases, indirect liability will be more common and possibly 
more damaging than direct liability. However, indirect liability is not of immediate 
concern to this paper. The remainder will concentrate on the effect and desirability of 
direct lender liability. 
B Direct Liability as an Owner of Occupier 
1 Section 314(1)(da) and Section 322(1)(b)(ii) 
Enforcement orders and abatement notices may impose liability to clean up 
contamination of the environment simply on the basis of a person's status as an 
'owner' or 'occupier' of land. Under section 314(1)(da), the Planning Tribunal may 
make an enforcement order requiring: 
"a person to do something that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, is 
necessary in order to av_oid, remedy, or mitigate any actual or likely 
adverse effect on the environment relating to any land of which the 
person is the owner or occupier." 
Section 322(l)(b)(ii) states that: 
"An abatement notice may be served on any person by an enforcement 
officer requiring that person to do something that, in the opinion of the 
enforcement officer, is necessary to ensure compliance by or on behalf 
of that person with this Act, any regulations, a rule in a plan or a 
proposed plan, or a resource consent, and also necessary to avoid, 
remedy, or mitigate any actual or likely adverse effect on the 
environment ... relating to any land of which the person is the owner or 
. " occupier. 
Section 314(1)(da) was inserted as from 7 July 1993 by the Resource Management 
Amendment Act 1993. It was not part of the original Act. Prior to this amendment, it 
had not been possible to use an enforcement order to place duties on owners and 
occupiers. In contrast, abatement notices had always placed obligations on owners or 
occupiers to avoid, remedy or mitigate adverse environmental effects.35 
Select Committee submissions and contemporary Ministry for the Environment 
documents regarding the Resource Management Amendment Bill reveal that subsection 
314(1)(da) was primarily inserted to ensure consistency between enforcement orders 
35 See the original section 322(1)(b) of the RMA. 
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and abatement notices. It was felt by the Ministry for the Environment that the issue of 
contaminated sites had become more important by 1993, and that abatement notices 
could not deal with the problem as effectively as enforcement orders.36 By inserting 
the new subsection into section 314, it was hoped enforcement orders would take on a 
new strength. 37 However, business groups responded negatively to the proposed 
amendment, pointing out that the provision had the potential to subject innocent parties 
to enforcement orders. 38 
Both section 314(l)(da) and section 322(1)(b)(ii) are of a type requiring positive action 
on the part of the person served by the notice or order. However, there are differences 
between the subsections. For an abatement notice to be issued under section 
322(l)(b)(ii), action must be required to ensure compliance with the Act, regulations, 
plan or consent. A breach of the restrictions in Part III of the Act (sections 9-15) or a 
breach of the general duty in section 1739 would be sufficient to constitute non-
compliance with the Act and thereby satisfy section 322(l)(b)(ii).40 In contrast, an 
36 Bronwyn Arthur, an official at the Ministry for the Environment, stated in an interview with the 
writer on 30 June 1995 that, at the time of drafting the RMA, it was envisaged that abatement notices 
and enforcement orders would be used to remove objectionable or offensive elements such as car 
wrecks. Contaminated sites were not at this point a priority. 
37 See for example, the Select Committee submission from New Zealand Chemical Industry Council 
Inc which stated: "It is understood that the main purpose of Clause 129 [which amended section 314] is 
to bring the law concerning enforcement orders into line with that set out in the Act for abatement 
notices". See also Ministry for the Environment Departmental Report on the Resource Management 
Amendment Bll April 1993 which states, in reference to the phrase "owner or occupier" that, "This 
should be covered by enforcement orders as well as abatement notices because abatement notices take at 
least 7 days before they have effect and if appealed do not have effect until appeals are decided. 
Enforcement orders can have an interim effect, similar to an injunction, if necessary. It is appropriate to 
be able to take the stronger action of enforcement orders". 
38 See for example, the submissions of Tasman Forestry Ltd, Winstone Aggregates Ltd, Natural 
Resource Users Group and Waste Management New Zealand Ltd (although the latter accepted "that it is 
in the public interest for the liability for environmental problems to be shared amongst the widest 
possible range of organisations and individuals".) 
It is interesting to note that over 15 submissions were received protesting against the ability of any 
person to apply for an enforcement order against an owner or occupier. Groups such as Carter Holt 
Harvey Ltd, Lion Nathan Ltd, Coal Corp and the Employers Federation expressed concern that 
disgruntled neighbours and business competitors would abuse the 'open standing' nature of 
participation. The Ministry and Select Committee bowed to this argument and consequently amended 
section 316(2) to ensure only local authorities could apply for such enforcement orders. See Ministry 
for the Environment Departmental Report on the Resource Management Amendment Bll April 1993, 
139-140. However, these fears were probably unfounded. As Jennifer Caldwell points out, of the 
enforcement orders sought to October 1993 where anyone could apply, only four were public interest 
groups ; business competitors have made seven applications; eight were sought by private individuals. 
The balance were sought by local authorities. See J Caldwell "Emerging Enforcement Trends under the 
Resource Management Act" (1994) 1 Butterworths Resource Management Bulletin 2, 3. 
39 Section 17 of the RMA provides that: 
"(1) Every person has a duty to avoid, remedy, or mitigate any adverse effect on the 
environment arising from an activity carried on by or on behalf of that person, whether or 
not the activity is in accordance with a rule in a plan, a resource consent, section 10, 
section lOA or section 20." 
40 Milne in above n 15, 3.04, 6.04; Waikato v Blissett Unreported, 21 Jan 1994, Planning Tribunal, 
C 6/94. 
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order under section 314(l)(da) can be made irrespective of whether there is non-
compliance. Such enforcement orders can be served simply where necessary to avoid, 
remedy or mitigate an adverse environmental effect. 
2 Defining an 'owner' and 'occupier' 
These provisions affect the current owner or occupier of the land. The definitions of 
owner and occupier therefore become crucial in determining the classes of persons 
affected by the legislation. Section 2 defines 'owner' in relation to any land, as: 
"the person who is for the time being entitled to the rack rent of the land 
or who would be so entitled if the land were let to a tenant at a rack rent 
,, 
'Occupier' means the inhabitant occupier of any property and: 
"in relation to any rateable property within the meaning of the Rating 
Powers Act 1988, includes any occupier of the property within the 
meaning of that Act". 
The Rating Powers Act 1988 defines 'occupier' in relation to any land as, inter alia, 
"the owner thereof ... ". That Act defines 'owner' in substantially the same way as the 
RMA. Hence, an occupier includes a person entitled to the rack rent4
1 of land. In 
summary, a person who is entitled to the rack rent of the land will qualify as both an 
owner and an occupier under the RMA.42 
3 Innocent purchasers 
In many cases, the current owner or occupier of the land will be the party responsible 
for causing an adverse environmental effect: their liability under sections 314(l)(da) 
and 322(l)(b)(ii) is not a contentious issue. However, because no requirement other 
than ownership or occupation is needed to attract liability under these subsections, other 
less culpable parties will find themselves liable for the clean-up costs of contamination. 
For example, an innocent purchaser of contaminated land would qualify as an 'owner' 
or 'occupier' thereby attracting liability, notwithstanding that it was their predecessor in 
title who caused the contamination. 
41 The rack rent represents the full annual value of the land. C Maher, above n 30, 3. 
42 Obviously, the definitions of owner and occupier in the RMA are wide enough to allow persons 
other than the bolder of the legal title or the fee simple to qualify as an owner or occupier of land. Thus 
it may be possible for one party to be an 'owner' for the purposes of the RMA while at the same time 
there exists another owner in the true sense of the word. 
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The plight of innocent purchasers is an important issue that needs to be addressed by 
policy makers, but it is an issue beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this paper 
focuses on lenders, for in certain situations, they too qualify as owners and occupiers 
and so attract liability under the Act, as the following sections show. 
4 Lenders as owners or occupiers 
Arguably, a lending institution (or a receiver appointed by the lending institution) will 
constitute an owner and/or occupier when it takes steps to realise its security either by 
entering into possession of the secured property or selling the property. 
( a) Entering into possession 
(i) A mortgagee in possession 
In New Zealand, .a mortgage does not operate as a transfer of the legal 
estate: the mortgagor remains the legal owner of the land, while the 
mortgagee obtains a charge over that land.43 The rights and powers of 
a mortgagee, including the mortgagee's right to possession, are 
therefore determined by contract (in the form of the mortgage 
instrument) and by statute (the Land Transfer Act 1952 and the Property 
Law Act 1952).44 Mortgage instruments often expressly confer a right 
or entitlement, upon default by the mortgagor, to enter into possession 
of the property.45 In the absence of an express conferment, section 106 
of the Land Transfer Act 1952 ('LTA') must be relied on. The section 
provides that: 
"The mortgagee, upon default in payment of the principal 
sum, interest, annuity, or rentcharge secured by any 
mortgage, or of any part thereof, may enter into 
possession of the mortgaged land by receiving the rents 
and profits thereof, or may bring an action for 
possession of the said land ... ". 
43 See section 100 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 which provides: "A mortgage under this Act shall 
have effect as security, but shall not operate as a transfer of the estate or interest charged". 
44 See Southpac Custodians Ltd v Bank of New Zealand [1993] 1 NZLR 663 (CA). See also The 
Housing Corporation of New Zealand v St John [1989] DCR 152, 165: "The rights and liabilities of 
the mortgagor and mortgagee are defined by the contract entered into between them in the form of the 
mortgage document" per Judge CJ Rushton. 
45 An example of such an express conferment in a mortgage document can be found in The Housing 
Corporation of New Zealand v St John above n 44, 155-156. 
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The value of section 106 lies in the fact that it gives a mortgagee an 
unqualified statutory right to enter into possession without the need to 
rely on a Court order or contractual powers.46 
The right to enter into possession does not arise until three requirements 
are satisfied: first, that the mortgagor is in default; second, that the 
mortgagee has served on the mortgagor a notice pursuant to section 92 
of the Property Law Act 1952 ('PLA') requiring the mortgagor to 
remedy the default; and finally that the mortgagor fails to comply with 
that notice.47 
According to the New Z.ealand Court of Appeal, the right to possession 
carries with it the right to receive the rents.48 This is also confirmed by 
section 91(11) and (15) of the PLA. Section 91(15) provides that a 
mortgagee "shall be deemed to be in possession of the land if he is 
entitled to enter i.nto possession thereof ... " while section 91(11) states 
that a mortgagee in possession of land is entitled, inter alia, to the rents. 
In other words, once a mortgagee is entitled to enter into possession, he 
or she is deemed to be in possession, which in turn implies an 
entitlement to rent. Hence, upon serving a section 92 notice, a 
mortgagee is not only entitled to enter into possession, but is entitled to 
receive the rack rent of the land. If a mortgagee chooses not to exercise 
its rights directly but instead to seek a court order for possession under 
section 106 of the LT A, then there is authority that the right to receive 
the rents arises when proceedings are filed.49 
As soon as the entitlement to receipt of the rents anses, the 
mortgagee/bank would constitute an 'owner' and an 'occupier' under 
the RMA. Therefore, if a bank takes steps to enforce its security over 
46 Southpac above n 44, 667. 
47 See Southpac Custodians Ltd v Bank of New 'Zealand (1992) 2 NZ ConvC 191,120, 191,129 (HC); 
St John above n 44, 161; Lockwood Buildings Ltd v Trust Bank Canterbury Ltd (1994) 2 NZ ConvC 
191 ,957, 191,966; S Dukeson & B Stewart Mortgagee Sales New Zealand Law Society Seminar 
June-July 1991, 41; CCH New 'Zealand Conveyancing Law and Practice (CCH NZ Limited, Auckland, 
1994), 58,303. 
48 See Southpac above n 44, 668 per Hardie Boys J. 
As a point of interest, while entitlement to rent is dependent on the existence of a right to possession, 
the receipt of rents does not of itself mean a mortgagee is deemed to have taken possession. To amount 
to an entry into possession, the mortgagee must take the control and management of the business out 
of the mortgagor's hands. This is achieved when a mortgagee gives notice to the mortgagor's tenants to 
pay their rent to the mortgagee or its agent. SeeSouthpac above n 47, 191,131 per Master Williams; 
CCH, above n 47, 58,305; HMS p434. 
49 Southpac above n 44, 668; CCH, above n 47, 58,304. 
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assets affected by environmental problems, it risks incurring direct 
liability under sections 314(1)(da) and 322(l)(b)(ii), by virtue of its 
possession or control of the property.50 
(ii) Receivers in possession 
A court-appointed receiver is an officer of the court, and neither an agent 
of the debtor company nor the debenture holder.5 1 The receiver 
therefore acts as principal and a lender would incur no liability. Where 
however, a lender in the position of a debenture holder or mortgagee 
appoints a receiver, the receiver may be deemed to be an owner or 
occupier for the purposes of the RMA. The receiver's liability may 
indirectly affect lenders, as the following paragraphs demonstrate. 
Receivers are usually appointed by debenture holders as a result of a 
debtor company defaulting under a debenture, or where the security is in 
jeopardy.52 A receiver's primary responsibility is to manage and realise 
the assets of the company charged with the security ,with a view to 
liquidating the debt due to the debenture holder.53 
The rights, powers and status of a receiver are determined primarily by 
the terms of the debenture document, subject to the provisions of the 
Receiverships Act 1993.54 Receivers are typically empowered to take 
possession of the company's assets in order to protect or supervise the 
company's business.55 More importantly, receivers are empowered to 
exercise all rights, powers and remedies as the company would exercise 
50 This is also the opinion of the Ministry for the Environment Investment Certainty under the 
Resource Management Act 1991 (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 1994), 30; S McArley 
above n 30; Brooker's Land Law (Brooker's, Wellington, 1995) and other colllIIlentalors. 
51 J H Farrar, M W Russell & L F Hampton Company Law and Securities Regulation in New 
7.ealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1985), 420. 
52 Above n 51, 420. 
53 James O'Donovan Company Receivers and Managers (Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney, 1981), 
112. 
54 Section 14(1) of the Receiverships Act 1993 provides: "A receiver has the powers and authorities 
expressly or impliedly conferred by U1e deed or agreement of the order of the Court by or under which 
the appointment was made". 
55 P Blanchard & M Gedye The Law of Company Receiverships in New 7.ealand and Australia 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1994), 54-56. It is important Lo note that when the receiver takes control 
of company property, he or she does so on behalf of the company. The company retains legal 
ownership, and usually possession of the properly as well. In rare situations, the receiver may 
dispossess the company and take possession in an independent capacity as principal. See Meigh v 
Wickenden (1942) 2 KB 160; Raiford v Northavon District Council (1987) 1 QB 357. 
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in relation to its property, which includes the right to receive rents and 
income.56 Therefore, for the purposes of the RMA, receivers are 
owners or occupiers who are exposed to liability under that Act 
Out of court receivers are usually expressed to be agents of the 
mortgagor/company,57 and so the debenture holder/bank will not attract 
liability as a principal. Nevertheless, it is customary for receivers to 
insist upon an indemnity from the debenture holder for liabilities 
incurred in the course of their role as receiver.58 Therefore, personal 
liability incurred by the receiver will directly impact upon the debenture 
holder. 
In certain situations, an out of court receiver can constitute an agent of 
the debenture holder.59 For example, the debenture may provide 
expressly for such a relationship. Second, a receiver may be deemed 
the agent of the debenture holder where the latter treats the receiver as 
such by directing or interfering with the receiver's activities.60 Finally, 
a court may hold that since an agent can have two principals, the 
receiver may be the agent of the company for some purposes and the 
agent of the debenture holder for others. 61 In such situations, the 
receiver will take possession of the company's assets and operate the 
56 Section 14(2)(a) of the Receiverships Act 1993 provides: "Subject to the deed or agreement or the 
order of the Court by or under which the appoinunent was made, a receiver may demand and recover, by 
action or otherwise, income of the property in receivership". See also the Auckland District Law 
Society standard form debenture, clause 6 which states the receiver has the power, inter alia, "exercise 
and enforce all such powers, rights, remedies and authorities as the Company itself might exercise over 
or in relation to its property ... ". 
57 At common law, where the debenture omitted to provide that a receiver was the agent of the 
company, the receiver would be deeemed to be the agent of the debenture holder. In New Zealand, the 
common law presumption is reversed by section 6(3) of the Receiverships Act 1993 which states that a 
receiver appointed privately pursuant to a deed or agreement is the agent of the grantor company unless 
the deed or instrument of appoinunent provides otherwise. See also Blanchard, above n 55, 51; 
American Express International Banking Corp v Hurley [1985] 3 All ER 564, 568. 
58 See S McArley, above n 30, 29-30. A receiver's right to an indemnity from the debenture holder is 
founded on an express tenn in his or her appointment or in the debenture itself. See O'Donovan, above 
n 53, 169. 
59 Note that the Receiverships Act 1993 does not apply to the situation where the receiver is expressly 
appointed as agent of the debenture holder. This is achieved through the statutory definition of receiver 
in section 2 of the Receiverships Act which excludes a mortgagee who goes into possession and the 
agent of any such mortgagee. 
60 For example, American Express v Hurley [1985] 3 All ER 564. See also above n 55, 52. 
61 For example, Peat Marwick Ltd v Consumers' Gas Co (1980) 113 DLR (3d) 754, 762 per Houlden 
JA. In this case, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognised that a receiver has a schizophrenic status and 
in reality serves two masters: the company and the debenture holders who appointed him or her. It 
therefore held that in carrying on the business, the receiver acts as agent of the company while in 
realising the security, he or she is the agent of the debenture holder. See also above n 55, 51-52. 
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business on behalf of the debenture holder, whose position will be that 
of a mortgagee in possession. As principal, the debenture holder will 
incur liability for the receiver's acts and omissions under section 340(1) 
of the RMA. 62 
Although relatively rare, a receiver can also be appointed by a 
mortgagee. There is no statutory power for a mortgagee to appoint a 
receiver in New Zealand, unlike Australia and the United Kingdom.63 
However, a mortgagee could appoint a receiver of rents where such a 
power is provided for in the mortgage document. Such a receiver 
would also constitute an owner and occupier by virtue of its receipt of 
rents and income from the property.64 As in the company context, a 
receiver will normally be an agent of the mortgagor but may also be 
indemnified by the mortgagee/bank. 65 
(b) Mortgagee exercises power of sale 
(i) Mortgagee purchases property 
Lenders need not enter into possession in order to constitute an owner or 
occupier; it will be sufficient for lenders to exercise their power of sale. 
The mortgagee's power of sale may be contractual or it may be implied 
by virtue of section 78 of the PLA.66 A mortgagee may sell the 
mortgaged property by one of two methods: private sale or sale by the 
Registrar of the High Court. 67 Sale by the latter method gives the 
62 Section 340(1) provides that: 
"Where an offence is committed against this Act by any person acting as the agent or 
employee of another person, that other person shall, without prejudice to the liability of 
the first-mentioned person, be liable under this Act in the same manner and to the same 
extent as if he, she, or it had personally committed the offence". 
63 See for example section 101 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (UK). 
64 Above n 47, 58. 
65 See CCH above n 47, 58,302; above n 47, 58. 
66 See CCH above n 47, 58,003. Section 78 of the PLA provides that: 
"In every mortgage of land made after the commencement of this Act there shall be 
implied the covenants by the mortgagor and the powers and conditions set forth in the 
Fourth Schedule to this Act, except in so far as the same are varied or negatived in the 
mortgage or deed ... ". 
Clause 8 of Schedule 4 provides Uiat the mortgagee may sell the mortgaged property where the 
mortgagor has defaulted provided that the requirements of that clause have been met. The provisions of 
clause 8 are generally modified in most mortgages and so the power of sale is usually a mixture of the 
implied power and contractual power. See CCH above n 47, 58,003. 
67 Section 99 of the PLA 1952. 
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mortgagee the right to buy in the property itself. 68 Clearly, if a 
mortgagee purchases contaminated land, it will be an owner of land and 
therefore exposed to liability under the RMA. 
( ii) Sale to a third party 
Even if a mortgagee arranges for the property to be sold to a third party, 
it may constitute an 'owner' or 'occupier' for the purposes of the RMA. 
A mortgagee cannot proceed to sell the secured property until the notice 
requirements of section 92 of the PLA have been complied with and 
there is a consequent failure of the mortgagor to remedy the default. 69 
Since the right to possession (which entails the right to receipt of the 
rents) also arises on fulfilment of these conditions, then compliance with 
section 92 will have the added effect of entitling the mortgagee to the 
rents from the land, irrespective of whether the mortgagee intends to 
recover those rents. 
The analysis above suggests that sections 314(1)(da) and 322(1)(b)(ii) 
have the potential to impose liability on lenders as owners or occupiers, 
if they take steps to enforce their security. The paper now turns to 
consider whether or not similar provisions in other New Zealand 
statutes, and in Canadian and Australian environmental legislation have 
been interpreted in a similar way. 
5 Comparable provisions in other New Zealand statutes 
An examination of current and previous New Zealand environmental regimes reveals 
that the concept of placing liability on owners and occupiers for the acts of others is not 
new to New Zealand. 
(a) Health Act 1956 
Under the Health Act 1956, environmental health officers may enter onto 
premises to abate nuisances, and recover the expenses incurred in abatement 
from the owner or the occupier of the premises.70 Section 41 provides that if 
68 Section 101 of the PLA 1952. 
69 See section 92 of the PLA 1952 and CCH above n 47, 57,904. 
70 See section 34 of the Health Act 1956. The definition of "owner" is the same as that in the RMA. 
In section 29, a "nuisance" is deemed to be created, for example, where any "accumulation or deposit is 
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any local authority is of the opinion that cleansing of any premises is necessary 
for preventing danger to health or for rendering the premises fit for occupation, 
it may serve an order on the owner or occupier of the premises requiring him to 
cleanse the premises. It is an offence under sections 30 and 41(3) to allow a 
nuisance to continue or to fail to comply with a cleansing order. 
The unreported High Court case of Garden City Developments Ltd v 
Christchurch City Council 71 concerned the issue of whether a landlord could 
be convicted under section 30(1) of the Health Act 1956, in view of the fact that 
the tenants were responsible for creating the nuisance. The Court held that the 
landlord was liable as an owner who had suffered a nuisance to continue. 
Hardie Boys J held that "section 30(1) plainly contemplates liability accruing to 
an owner who is not the occupier".72 Arguably, the same reasoning could 
apply to make a mortgagee liable under the section.73 However, the case 
turned on the particular meaning of the word "sufferance" and the obligations of 
landlords and tenants. Therefor~, while it provides evidence of the courts' 
readiness to impose liability on innocent owners and occupiers, if offers little 
guidance as to whether the courts would impose such liability on lenders. 
(b) Toxic Substances Act 1979 
The Toxic Substances Act 1979 provides in section 48 that an officer, including 
a police officer, may secure land or premises if he has reason to suspect it has 
been contaminated by a toxic substance. The officer must take all reasonable 
steps to have the land or premises decontaminated. The reasonable costs and 
expenses incurred in the decontamination are recoverable from the owner of the 
land or premises as a debt due to the Crown.74 
in such a state or is so situated as to be offensive or likely to be injurious to health" or where "the 
burning of any waste material, rubbish, or refuse in connection with any trade, business, manufacture, 
or other undertaking produces smoke in such quantity, or of such nature, or in such manner, as to be 
offensive or likely to be injurious to health". 
71 Unreported, 25 March 1986, High Court, Christchurch Registry, AP 25/86. 
72 Above n 71, 2. 
73 Hardie Boys J alluded to the possiblity of lender liability but avoided deciding the point. He stated 
at page 2 that the appellant "sought to compare the position of a mortgagee but I see little point in 
pursuing that line of enquiry for that must await decision on the particular circumstances of the case if 
at any time proceedings are brought against a mortgagee." See above n 71. 
74 Section 48 of the Toxic Substances Act 1979. The Act also provides that the owner can apply for 
an order from the Court for compensation for loss or damage as a result of the decontamination, or for 
relief from liability for the costs of the decontamination (section 49). A "toxic substance" is defined to 
include poison, insecticide or pesticide, or any other substance that by reason of its chemical or 
biochemical properties may adversely affect the environment (section 2). 
24 
( c) Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
The now repealed Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 made it an offence 
under section 34(1)([) for "the occupier of any land" to cause or permit "any 
waste, emanating as a result of natural processes from matter previously placed 
on or discharged on to the land or into the ground, to enter natural water." 
Under section 34B, Regional Water Boards or local authorities were given 
power to seek from a District Court an order that a person do certain work to 
prevent a further contravention of or non-compliance with any provision (such 
as s34(1)(f)) in the Act. Whether or not a person was convicted of an offence 
under section 34, section 34C provided that an occupier who caused or 
permitted waste to enter natural water could be charged with the costs of 
disposing of or neutralising the effects of the discharge. 
(d) Town and Country Planning Act 1977 
Under section 77(4) and (6) of the repealed Town and Country Planning Act 
1977, the Council for the district could serve notice on the person using the land 
or the owner of land to cease, remove or reduce a "use of any land or building 
giving rise to any objectionable element". 
The definitions of 'owner' and 'occupier' in these four Acts are essentially the 
same as those in the RMA. As with the comparable RMA provisions, there is 
nothing in the above provisions to suggest the owner or occupier had to be 
responsible for creating the nuisance or contaminating the ground or water in the 
first place. Hence, under these Acts, lenders in the position of an owner or 
occupier could conceivably be held liable to remedy the environmentally 
unsound activities of others. 
However, the powers that existed under these Acts to impose liability on 
innocent owners and occupiers have not been utilised against lenders.7
5 
According to the Ministry for the Environment, "[t]o some extent, the judgment 
of regional and district councils could be relied upon in the past to see that such 
claims were not made against innocent land owners."
76 Therefore, little 
assistance in interpreting the comparable RMA provisions can be derived from 
these other statutes as no body of case law has developed around them. 
75 Ministry for the Environment, above n 50, 31. 
76 Ibid. 
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6 Comparable provisions in Canadian and Australian statutes 
However, we can obtain a great deal of assistance in interpreting sections 314(1)(da) 
and 322(1)(b)(ii) of the RMA by examining comparable environmental legislation from 
foreign jurisdictions. Like New Zealand, most industrialised countries are faced with 
the intractable problem of determining who should pay for the remediation of 
contaminated sites. Canada and Australia, among others, 77 have passed legislation that 
would enable lenders to be held liable as owners and occupiers for the costs of cleaning 
up pollution caused by others. 
(a) Canada 
The response of Canadian legislatures and courts to environmental problems has 
been dramatic. Clearly emerging is a judicial and legislative trend which 
favours the clean-up of the environment over the interests of lenders. For 
example, Ontario's principle ~nvironmental statute, the Environmental 
Protection Act, RSO 1980 c.141 contains a comprehensive and powerful 
regulatory scheme for environmental conservation. That Act authorises the 
issuance of several types of orders either by the Minister of the Environment or 
by a Director appointed by the Minister. The orders include control orders to 
reduce the amount of emissions,78 stop orders to terminate discharges,79 
orders for the removal of waste, 80 and orders to undertake a wide range of 
actions to control a possible future discharge.81 It is an offence, punishable by 
a fine of up to $1 million, to fail to comply with an order.82 
Of special significance is the range of parties against whom the Director may 
issue orders. In particular, the Director may issue orders to: 83 
(a) an owner or previous owner of the source of contaminant; 
(b) a person who is or was in occupation of the source of contaminant; or 
77 The United Kingdom Parliament has recently introduced a new Environment Bill which also places 
liability for clean-up of pollution on owners and occupiers, where the polluter cannot be found. See 
Mark Stallworthy "The United Kingdom's New Approach to Liability for Contaminated Land" (1995) 7 
JIBL 255, 256. 
78 Section 6 of the Environmental Protection Act RSO 1980 c.141. 
79 Section 7 of the Environmental Protection Act RSO 1980 c.141. 
80 Section 41 of the Environmental Protection Act RSO 1980 c.141. 
81 Section 17(1) of the Environmental Protection Act RSO 1980 c.141. 
82 Section 147(1) of the Environmental Protection Act RSO 1980 c.141. 
83 See sections 6(1), 7(1), 17(1), 41(1), 42 of the Environmental Protection Act RSO 1980 c.141. 
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(c) a person who has or had the charge, management or control of the source of 
contaminant. 
These parties are the same parties that can incur liability under sections 
314(1)(da) and 322(1)(b)(ii) of the RMA. However, the Canadian statute goes 
even further by imposing liability on previous owners, occupiers and persons in 
control of contaminants. 84 In other words, banks could be required to 
remediate contamination of property over which they no longer possess security 
interests. To compound matters, the Canadian Act can prohibit any person with 
an interest in the property from disposing of the property without giving a copy 
of the order to the party acquiring it; failure to do so makes the transaction 
voidable. 85 Such a provision ensures that lenders will have great difficulty 
ridding themselves of polluted property. The lender liability provisions in the 
Canadian statute are therefore even more stringent than those in the RMA. 
Bankruptcy and insolvency law have also been affected by judicial 
environmental activism. Canadian courts have held that environmental clean-up 
orders by regulatory agencies take priority over secured and unsecured 
creditors, with the result that creditors bear the costs of remediation. 86 For 
example, in the cases of Canada Trust v Bulora Corp Ltd, 87 Panamericana De 
Bienes y Servicios SA v Northern Badger Oil & Gas Co 88 and Lamford Forest 
Products Ltd,89 the respective courts held that receivers are under a legal duty 
to comply with clean-up orders, in priority to the claims of creditors, even if 
compliance would exhaust funds otherwise intended for creditors. 
( b) Australia 
The environmental regimes of Australian states are considerably less stringent 
than their Canadian counterparts, although lender liability remains a possibility. 
For example, in both New South Wales and Victoria, the relevant state authority 
has the power to serve remediation notices on the occupier of premises, 
directing the occupier to "take such prescribed remedial action as is reasonable 
84 See Derrick C Tay "The Emerging Priority of Environmental Orders in Canadian Insolvency 
Situations" (1992) 5 JIBL 202. 
85 Section 150(1) and (4) of the Environmental Protection Act RSO 1980 c.141. 
86 Above n 84. 
87 (1980) 34 CBR (NS) 145, affd 39 CBR (NS) 152 (Ontario Court of Appeal). 
88 (1991) 5 WWR 577. 
89 (1991) BCJ No 3681 (unreported). 
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in the circumstances and as may be specified in the notice".90 As in the RMA, 
the New South Wales legislation enables the Authority to clean up the premises 
itself and recoup costs and expenses as a debt from "an appropriate defendant", 
who is defined to include both the polluter and the person on whom a clean-up 
notice is served (such as the occupier).91 
While these provisions could technically entail lender liability, the New South 
Wales and Victorian environmental authorities have indicated that they will not 
proceed against lenders unless they possess control or influence over the site or 
the criminal conduct of the borrower.92 This represents a policy decision that 
"the guiding principle for the [Authority] is the culpability of defendants in 
relation to the offence. More than technical legal liability will be necessary as a 
pre-requisite to prosecution" _93 
On the other hand, the recent report by the Australia New Zealand Environment 
Conservation Council94 (ANZECC) setting out their policy position on 
financial liability for contaminated site remediation, suggests a change in 
direction. This report states that where lenders act solely as holders of a 
security interest in a contaminated site and take no steps to enforce the security, 
they should not be liable for the costs of remediation. However, where the 
lenders have either caused the pollution or have assumed the position of owner 
or occupier, they should be liable in the same way as any other party.95 
Therefore, if the New Zealand courts are prepared to impose liability on lenders 
as owners or occupiers of contaminated land under the RMA, it is submitted that 
overseas precedents exist for them to draw on as authority for such an 
approach. 
90 Section 35 of the Environmentally Hazardous Chemicals Act 1985 (NSW); section 62A of the 
Environment Protection Act 1970 (Vic). If the contamination results in pollution of waters, the NSW 
Authority may also require the occupier of the land causing pollution to remove the pollution pursuant 
to section 27 A of t11e Clean Waters Act 1970 (NSW). "Occupier" is defined in both states as "the 
person in occupation or control of the premises". See section 3 of the Environmentally Hazardous 
Chemicals Act 1985; section 4 of the Environment Protection Act 1970. 
91 See section 36 of the Environmentally Hazardous Chemicals Act 1985; also ANZECC, above n 
29, 50-51. 
92 Above n 29, 56; above n 10, 46-47. 
93 New South Wales Environment Protection Authority Draft Guidelines, 1992 quoted in above n 10, 
46. 
94 Financial Liability for Contaminated Site Remediation: A Position Paper, April 1994. 
95 C Schulz "National Pollutant Inventory and Financial Liability for Contaminated Sites : Reports 
Released" (1994) 22 Aust Bus L Rev 441, 443. 
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C Direct Liability for Involvement in Management 
Liability can extend to a lender under the RMA even if it does not constitute an owner 
or occupier, if it can be established that the lender has exercised some control over, or 
has become involved in, the management of its borrower's business. 
1 Section 340( 3) 
Lenders are sometimes involved with their debtors' financial management, especially in 
the context of work-outs and other corporate rescue projects where financiers have 
considerable expertise. For example, lenders may be required to develop a scheme to 
enable a borrower to work through its financial difficulties in order to prevent the 
borrower defaulting on its loan. Such actions may place lenders in a decision-making 
role where they have significant control over the operations and management of the 
borrower's business. However, lenders risk incurring criminal liability under section 
340(3) of the RMA if this occurs.96 The _section provides: 
"Where any body corporate is convicted of an offence against this Act, 
every director and every person concerned in the management of the 
body corporate shall be guilty of the like offence if it is proved -
(a) That the act that constituted the offence took place with his or her 
authority, permission or consent; and 
(b) That he or she knew or could reasonably be expected to have 
known that the offence was to be or was being committed and 
failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent or stop it". 
2 Meaning of the phrase "concerned in the management" 
(a) New 'Zealand authority 
No New Zealand resource management cases have focused directly on the 
meaning of the phrase "concerned in the management". In a case concerning 
section 188(1) of the Companies Act 1955, Quilliam J stated that a person 
would be "concerned in the management" where that person "took a hand in the 
real business affairs of the company".97 This interpretation would incorporate 
96 Brooker's Land Law, above n 50, para 8.6.03. 
91 R v Newth [1974) 2 NZLR 760, 761. Section 188(1) of the Companies Act 1955 provides that: 
"If any person being an undiscbarged bankrupt acts as director of, or directly or indirectly 
takes part in or is concerned in the management of, any company except with the leave of 
the Court, be shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 2 years ... ". 
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a far wider range of parties than merely directors or shareholders of a company: 
among others, it could incorporate lenders. 
(b) Australian authority 
A provision similar to section 188 of the Companies Act 1955 exists in the 
Companies (Victoria) Code.98 A comprehensive discussion on the scope of 
this provision was considered by the Supreme Court of Victoria in the case of 
Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Bracht.99 Ormiston J interpreted the 
phrase "concerned in the management" to mean an involvement in the 
company's decision-making process such that the person has either a measure 
of responsibility, an area of discretion, or some influence based on his or her 
advice or opinion. According to the New Zealand Law Society, this 
interpretation covers not only trustees, receivers, consultants, influential 
shareholders and directors, but also lenders. 100 
( c) United States authority - CERCI.A 
Like the RMA, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act of 1980 (known as CERCLA) imposes liability on persons 
who are too closely involved in the management of a polluting business. 
CERCLA was passed as a response to the Love Canal disaster of the 1970s
10 1 
and other discoveries of hazardous waste dumps around the country. 
CERCLA102 imposes retrospective, joint and several, strict liability for clean-
up of contaminated sites on a wide range of potentially responsible parties, 
including the current "owner and operator of a vessel or facility" releasing 
98 Section 227(1) of the Companies (Victoria) Code. Section 227(1) provides: 
"A person who is insolvent under administration shall not be a director or promoter of, or 
be in any way (whether directly or indirectly) concerned in or take part in the management 
of, a corporation without the leave of the Court". 
99 (1989] YR 821; (1988) 14 ACLR 728. 
100 J Allin, R Fisher and T Randerson Resource Management Act 1991, New Zealand Law Society 
Seminar, September - October 1991, 88. 
10 1 In 1978 it was discovered that citizens of Love Canal, New York were living on top of an 
abandoned waste dump containing approximately 352 million pounds of chemical waste, including 
dioxin, one of the deadliest substances in existence. See Alderman, above n 4, 312. 
102 CERCLA created a 'Superfund' to cover the costs of governmental remediation of polluted sites. 
In order to preserve the Superfund's resources, the government is empowered to collect the clean-up 
costs from appropriate parties. G W Boston and M S Madden Law of Environment and Toxic Torts: 
Cases, Materials and Problems (American Casebook Series, West Publishing Co, St Paul, Minn., 
1994) 476. 
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hazardous substances. 103 Under the 'security interest exemption', CERCLA 
excludes from the definition of owner/operator a person who "holds indicia of 
ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility" 
provided the person does not "participat[ e] in the management" of the property. 
The extent of participation or control required for liability to attach to the lender 
has been a controversial question in the American courts. United States v 
Mirabile 104 held that a secured creditor incurs liability when it asserts control 
over and actually participates in the production or operational aspects of the 
debtor's business. A creditor may safely participate in the debtor's financial 
affairs if that involvement is necessary to protect a security interest. Guidice v 
BFG Electroplating and Manufacturing Co 105and In re Bergsoe Metal Corp 
106 adopted a similar control standard, requiring "some actual management of 
the facility before a secured creditor will fall outside the exception". 107 
However, in United States v Fleet Factors Corp,108 decided several months 
after Bergsoe, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
expressly rejected the Mirabile standard.109 The court held that a secured 
creditor will incur liability: 110 
by participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a 
capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous wastes. It is not 
necessary for the secured creditor to actually involve itself in the day-to-day 
operations of the facility in order to be liable ... Rather, a secured creditor will be 
liable if its involvement with the facility is sufficiently broad to support the 
inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose. 
In other words, a lender could be held liable without actually participating in the 
operations of the company. 
In response to an outcry by the lending community, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) in 1992 promulgated a final rule clarifying the security 
interest exemption, designed to broaden the lender's exemption from 
liability .111 It rejected the Fleet Factors "ability to control" test and stated that a 
103 Section 107(a)(l) CERCLA. 
104 15 Envtl L Rep 20,992 (ED Pa 1985). 
105 732 F Supp 556 (WD Pa 1989). 
106 910 F 2d 668 (9th Cir 1990). 
l07 Above n 106, 672. 
108 901 F. 2d 1550, (11th Cir. 1990). 
109 Above n 108, 1558. 
110 Above 11 108, 1557-1558. 
111 See Alderman above 11 4, 332; Boston and Madden above n 102, 495. 
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lender participates in management when it exercises actual control over a 
facility's day to day operations. The EPA also set out a list of permissible 
lender activities such as requiring environmental audits and evidence of 
compliance with environmental laws, undertaking workout activities, and 
recovering the value of the security interest.112 However, further uncertainty 
as to the scope of the exemption has arisen in light of the decision of Kelley v 
US EPA ll 3 in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia vacated 
the EPA's rule and held that the EPA lacked authority to define the scope of 
lender liability.114 
Despite the complexities of CERCLA case law, the above discussion indicates 
that the American legislation is capable of imposing liability on lenders and 
secured creditors who are closely involved in the management of debtors' 
businesses. New Zealand courts, drawing on such an approach, could 
therefore impose liability on New Zealand lenders who play a similar 
management role. 
It is important to bear in mind that although a lender has the potential to incur 
liability under section 340(3) by virtue of its involvement in a debtor's 
company, it will only be guilty of the offence if it is proved that the act which 
constituted the offence took place with the lender's authority, permission or 
consent, and knowing that the offence would be committed, the lender failed to 
prevent it. In other words, a lender will only be held liable under section 340(3) 
where it has expressly or impliedly authorised or instructed its customer to 
undertake environmentally unsound activities. In this scenario, there is an 
obvious justification for imposing liability on lenders: they have clearly acted 
culpably or with reckless disregard for the environment. In contrast, it is much 
more difficult to justify the imposition of liability on lenders under sections 
314(l)(da) and 322(1)(b)(ii). For this reason, the paper will concentrate on 
analysing the latter form of lender liability. 
112 Above n 29, 71. 
l 13 15 F.3d 1100 (DC Cir. 1994). 
l 14 The Court's rationale was that Congress could not have intended that the EPA, which invariably 
acts as plaintiff in CERCLA proceedings, could have the power to interpret CERCLA provisions. 
Rather, it was for the courts to adjudicate upon private rights of action arising under CERCLA. See 
above n 113, 1104. As Johnston stated: "to provide EPA with the interpretive authority would be akin 
to proving criminal prosecutors (as opposed to the courts) with the ultimate authority to interpret the 
enforcement provisions they implement". See C N Johnston "Superfund Reauthorization: Who Decides 
Who's Liable under CERCLA : EPS Slips a Bombshell into the CERCLA Reauthorization Process" 
(1994) 24 Envtl L 1045, 1047. 
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D Is Lender Liability a Genuine Threat? 
Having established that the RMA has the potential to impose direct liability on lenders 
for the costs of remediating polluted sites, it is pertinent to query whether lending 
institutions should have cause for concern. In other words, will such liability place an 
excessively onerous burden on lenders, and is the likelihood of facing direct liability 
high? 
1 Severity of liability 
As far as the burden on lenders is concerned, lender liability is not limited to or in any 
way related to the money lent to the borrower under the mortgage or security. Clean up 
costs can range into the millions of dollars, and failure to comply with enforcement 
orders or abatement notices carries the additional penalty of up to $200,000. In other 
words, the cost of environmental remediation could easily exceed the amount of the 
loan or the value of the property. Forth.is reason, as a worst case scenario (and in the 
absence of insurance), lender liability could pose a considerable threat to the economic 
viability of lending institutions, especially smaller institutions. 
2 Likelihood of liability 
Despite the theoretical possibility of liability, the chances of liability actually being 
imposed on lenders have historically been relatively small. As this paper has shown, 
lenders have not been prosecuted under other environmental statutes in New Zealand. 
To date, no New Zealand cases have addressed the issue of lender liability under the 
RMA. The lack of case law is due in part to the remarkable reluctance of local 
authorities to use the RMA's enforcement provisions to their full potential. The 
overwhelming majority of enforcement orders have been used to order the cessation or 
prohibition of unlawful activities, or the removal of nuisance-type objects from 
sites. 11 5 Few orders have been issued requiring positive action under sections 
314(1)(b), (c), (da) or 322(1)(b). 
Why have local authorities been reluctant to prosecute lenders ? In the first place, local 
authorities probably aim to place liability on the person responsible for causing the 
pollution. This preference is evident from a number of cases in which innocent owners 
of land have been excused from liability. For example, in Foodstuffs (Auckland) Ltd v 
115 See Caldwell, above n 38. 
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Rattrays Wholesale Ltd l l6 the owner of the land was cited as a respondent in the 
interim application, but was excluded from the final order because it was not 
responsible for the breach. In Waitakere City Council v Gordon 117 the Planning 
Tribunal named the owner of the land and the person responsible for the breaches in 
order to effect the charge, but only the latter was held liable for costs. It is only when 
the polluter cannot be found or is insolvent that authorities will seek another party to 
bear the costs of remediation. 
Second, having identified a lending institution as a possible source of funds, the local 
authority would then need to establish as a question of law that the lender acted in a 
way that rendered it an owner, occupier or concerned in the management of a body 
corporate. 
Finally, Ministry for the Environment officials, Craig Mallett and Bronwyn Arthur, 
have suggested in interviews with the writer that inaction by local authorities may be 
due to several other factors: the fear on the part of local authorities of potentially 
crippling litigation battles with lenders; lack of appreciation by local authorities of the 
severity of the environmental problem; or possibly even a lack of awareness that such 
parties could be held liable under the RMA. 11 8 However, they also suggested that as 
the problem of contaminated sites becomes more urgent, as it must, cases of lender 
liability could become more common. 
It is submitted that if a New Zealand court is faced with such a case in the future, it 
would have to hold that lenders are caught by the RMA provisions. Not only does 
statutory interpretation point the courts to this conclusion, but overseas jurisdictions 
have held lenders liable under legislative provisions almost identical to those in the 
RMA. There is no reason why New Zealand courts will not follow suit. Hence, 
lenders run a real risk of incuning liability under the RMA, notwithstanding the current 
reluctance of local authorities to pursue the full potential of their statutory powers. 
V ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF LENDER LIABILITY 
The previous sections have demonstrated that the RMA has the capacity to impose liability 
on lenders, and that courts may be willing to enforce such liability in appropriate cases. 
116 Unreported, 25 June 1993, Planning Tribunal, Wl 1/93. 
117 Unreported, 25 April 1993, Planning Tribunal, A13/93 . 
118 Interview 30 June 1995 . 
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The following sections of the paper are concerned with the more important question of 
whether the imposition of liability on lenders in this situation can be justified. 
In order to undertake this analysis, it is necessary to take several preliminary steps. It is 
first necessary to understand exactly how lender liability under the RMA differs from other 
types of liability. To this end, the paper will identify and explain the unusual features of 
lender liability. Second, no analysis of this type can be valuable unless the purpose of such 
an analysis is clear. It seems to the writer that the purpose of this inquiry is to ascertain 
whether the concept of lender liability is consistent with the goals of environmental law, 
and whether it accomplishes these goals in practice. If the answer to these questions is no, 
then the conclusion must be that lender liability cannot be justified as a matter of principle. 
To this end, the paper will determine what we want a system of environmental law to 
accomplish, before going on to measure the success or failure of lender liability in 
achieving these goals. 
A The Unusual Nature of Lender Lit;1bility 
At first glance, it may seem unnecessary to justify the existence of a concept like lender 
liability. This would be true if lender liability fitted the accepted and uncontroversial 
patterns of liability found elsewhere in the law. However, lender liability possesses several 
unusual features that do not seem to fit easily with these patterns. 
1 Lack of a fault requirement 
Many areas of the law require proof of fault or wrongdoing on the part of the defendant 
before imposing liability on that party. This can be seen, for example, in the field of 
negligence, and in criminal law where offences typically include mens rea requirements. In 
contrast, lender liability under the RMA does not require a lender to be in any way at fault 
with regard to the discharge of contamination on a site. 
2 Lack of a causation requirement 
What is more unusual is that the RMA provisions do not require a lender to have caused 
pollution in order to be liable for the costs of its clean-up. It is almost axiomatic in tort law 
and criminal law that at the very least, the party bearing the costs of an activity will have 
caused the activity or created the offending state of affairs. This is evident in absolute or 
strict liability criminal offences: it is not necessary to show fault or knowledge, but it is 
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crucial to satisfy actus reus requirements. In tort law the causation requirement is 
"elementary policy": 119 
With but a few recently developed and very limited exceptions, ... the rule has been: no matter 
how tortious the defendant's conduct may have been and no matter how long or how strongly a 
given loss has been considered compensable, unless the plaintiff is able to persuade the fact 
finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's activity was at least one of the 
infinite 'but for' causes of his losses, the plaintiff cannot recover. 
3 Quasi-vicarious liability 
Arguably the imposition of liability on lenders for the activities of their customers involves 
an application of the common law doctrine of vicarious liability. Again however, lender 
liability does not fit the pattern. Vicarious liability is often applied in regulatory quasi-
criminal offences such as those in the RMA, but only to parties who authorise others to do 
the offending act. 120 While lenders are effectively being held vicariously liable for the 
actions of customers, it is not necessarily due to the fact that they authorised customers to 
undertake environmentally unsound practices. 
4 Status as an owner or occupier 
Instead, the wording of sections 314(l)(da) and 322(l)(b)(ii) of the RMA means that a 
party is exposed to financial liability simply by virtue of its status as an owner or occupier. 
One need only prove that a lender occupied a certain role, not that it engaged in particular 
behaviour. 
5 What is the significance of this ? 
The fact that lender liability departs from tort law and criminal law principles does not, of 
itself, invalidate the concept. However, it means that there should be strong reasons to 
justify the continuance of such an errant form of liability, because in departing from 
traditional forms of liability, one also departs from the protections they provide. 
Any new legal doctrine of uncertain scope is an inherently dangerous beast. Usually the 
legal system responds to such unruly doctrines by circumscribing their scope and carefully 
119 H C Klemme "The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts" (1976) 47 U Colo Law Rev 153, 163. 
The Committee Report accompanying the CERCLA Bill through Congress also confirmed this view: 
"[F]or liability to attach .. . , the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal or contributory nexus between the 
acts of the defendant and the conditions which necessitated response action". In Oswald, above n 6, 600. 
120 J B RobertsonAdams on Criminal Law vol 2 (Brooker & Friend Ltd, Wellington, 1992), 4.1.02. 
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defining the doctrine's relationship with other legal doctrines. That process has not yet 
occurred with the relatively recent concept of lender liability. This provides all the more 
reason for analysing why the legislature has seen fit to place the costs of pollution on 
lenders in some circumstances, and whether this decision can be justified. 
B Law and Economics 
This paper will draw on the Law and Economics literature to analyse whether lender 
liability is appropriate in the environmental context. As the Law and Economics 
movement121 has shown, economics can be a powerful tool for analysing, and providing 
insights into, many aspects of the law. By way of background, the following paragraphs 
explain some central concerns and basic principles of economics, and the means by which 
such an approach can assist in analysing the merits of lender liability. 
The central task of economics is to explore how humans behave under conditions of 
scarcity. According to Richard Posner, "economics is the science of rational choice in a 
world ... in which resources are limited in relation to human wants".1
22 Given scarcity, 
economists assume that individuals will attempt to maximise their desired ends. The 
concept of humans as rational maximisers of their self-interest implies that they respond to 
incentives; that if people's surroundings change in such a way that they could increase their 
satisfactions by altering their behaviour, then they will do so.123 
Obviously, the legal system structures and controls the choices available to individuals. It 
therefore creates incentives to act in certain ways and disincentives to act in others. 
Positive economic analysis of law is concerned with examining the incentive effects and 
121 The modem law and economics movement emerged in the 1960s with pioneering articles by 
Guido Calabresi on tort law and Ronald Coase on property rights. See M Trebilcock, "Law and 
Economics" (1993) 16 Dalhousie Law Journal 360, 360-361. Much United States law and economics 
scholarship has focused on applying economic analysis to the field of tort law and accident law. The 
debate has largely centred on what form a tort regime should take to promote efficiency objectives, and 
in particular whether strict liability or the traditional negligence standard provides the most efficient 
liability regime. For example, Calabresi and Shaven favour strict liability over fault liability, while 
Posner, Landes and others defend the negligence standard. See G Calabresi The Costs of Accidents : A 
Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970); R A Posner "Strict 
Liability: A Comment" (1973) 2 J Legal Studies 205; S Shaven "Strict Liability versus Negligence" 
(1980) 9 J Legal Studies 1. Although highly influential, the movement has attracted a great deal of 
criticism and controversy. Critics of the movement argue that law and economics ignores justice, 
manifests a conservative political bias and fails to provide an ethical or moral guide to improving the 
legal system. See M Trebilcock "Law and Economics" (1993) 16 Dalhousie Law Journal 360, 365; R 
A Posner Economic Analysis of Law (4 ed, Little, Brown & Co, Boston, 1992), 25-27. 
122 Posner, above n 121, 3. 
123 Posner, above n 121, 4; Trebilcock, above n 121, 362. 
37 
distributional consequences of particular legal regimes or systems of liability.124 In other 
words, economists ask the following kind of question: if this legal policy is implemented, 
how will people respond, and what will be the likely economic impact? Understanding the 
incentive effects of various legal regimes enables us to judge whether that regime provides 
the most efficient means of attaining the regime's goals. 
The concept of efficiency is central to economics. Efficiency is a measure of the degree to 
which particular allocations of resources maximise their value. 125 The Law and 
Economics movement argues that economic efficiency is one of the primary goals of the 
legal system. In other words, economists claim that many of the doctrines and institutions 
of the legal system are best understood and explained as efforts to promote the efficient 
allocation of resources, and thereby maximise society's wealth. 126 The task of this paper 
is to examine how the search for efficiency shapes the goals of environmental law, and 
whether those goals are best accomplished by placing pollution costs on lenders. 
C The Goals of Environmental Law 
This paper argues that the two principal goals of environmental law are first, to achieve an 
efficient allocation of resources (which entails reduction of the sum of pollution costs and 
pollution avoidance costs); and second, to achieve a fair and just distribution of the social 
costs resulting from pollution. 
1 Efficient allocation of resources 
If the efficient allocation of resources is one of the primary goals of the legal system as a 
whole, then it is certainly true of environmental law. To the economist, the environmental 
problem is one of the leading instances of resource misallocation. 1
27 Achieving an 
efficient allocation of resources is therefore seen as a crucial step in protecting the 
environment. Lawmakers in New Zealand have explicitly recognised the importance of 
economic efficiency to environmental law. Section 7 of the RMA provides in part that: 
124 KS Abraham Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory, and Public Policy (Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1986), 10; Trebilcock, above n 121, 362. 
125 Abraham, above n 124, 10; Posner, above n 121, 13. Efficiency or economic performance can be 
measured in several ways by economists. For example, Pareto efficiency aims to improve a person's 
welfare without diminishing someone else's. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, on the other hand, is achieved 
when beneficiaries of a transaction have made sufficient gains that they could hypothetically 
compensate third parties for any harm suffered by them, and still have gains left over for themselves. 
See Trebilcock, above n 121,364; Posner, above n 121, 13-14. 
126 Posner, above n 121, 22-23. 
127 R Dorfman and N S Dorfman (eds) Economics and the Environment: Selected Readings (3 ed, W 
W Norton & Co, New York, 1993), 75. 
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In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising functions and powers under it, in 
relation to managing the use, development, and protection of natural and physical resources, 
shall have particular regard to - ... 
(b) The efficient use and development of natural and physical resources. 
The High Court in Machinery Movers further emphasised the role of efficiency in 
designing environmental laws.128 
In the context of environmental law, the general goal of efficient resource allocation entails 
reduction of the sum of the costs of pollution and the costs of avoiding pollution.129 This 
formula is premised on the idea that resources are allocated inefficiently if the costs of 
pollution130 exceed the costs of avoiding pollution, yet a person chooses to pollute. It is 
more efficient to spend money on pollution prevention if the pollution could have been 
avoided at a cost lower than the expected pollution cost. In other words, in the context of a 
legal regime which imposes liability on polluters, individuals should undertake a cost-
benefit analysis in determining whether to take one of two paths: polluting and risking 
liability for clean-up costs, or avoiding Pc:>llution in the first place. 
For example, suppose that a factory dumps waste into a river as part of its manufacturing 
process. Assume that the annual cost to society of the pollution is $100,000, and that the 
existing legal regime would impose liability on the polluter for the full amount of the social 
cost. Pollution reduction devices can be installed in the factory at a cost of $60,000. By 
investing $60,000 in the device, the factory owners can save $100,000 on liability costs, 
for a net saving of $40,000. Under these conditions, the factory owners have a strong 
incentive to invest in pollution prevention. In this way, the sum of pollution costs and 
pollution avoidance costs to society is reduced. 
Of course, if conditions are such that pollution avoidance costs exceed the costs to the 
polluter of polluting, then incentives will change. It will be more efficient under these 
circumstances for the factory owners to continue to pollute. Hence, if society values a 
128 Above n 26, 670. 
129 This formula is used in economic analysis of many areas of the law. For example, economists 
such as Calabresi, Posner and Trebilcock accept that the search for efficiency in accident law requires 
minimising the sum of accident costs and accident avoidance costs. See Calabresi, above n 121, 26; 
Trebilcock, above n 121, 370; Posner, above n 121 , 24. Abraham argues that insurance law promotes 
efficiency whenever it reduces the sum of insurance costs and loss prevention costs. See above n 124, 
11. 
130 Measurement of the costs of pollution is extremely difficult. Many of the costs of pollution are 
intangible: extinction of species, lost recreation opportunities, pollution-related health problems and so 
on. The lack of accurate information can affect whether individuals are capable of allocating resources 
efficiently. See L Ruff "The Economic Common Sense of Pollution" in Dorfman, above n 127, 24-
25. Also see below Part VIII A 3. 
39 
clean environment, it becomes crucial for the legal system to create conditions in which 
polluters are encouraged to invest in deterrence. 
However, it is important to note that our society is not committed to preserving the 
environment or avoiding pollution at all costs. Pollution costs are not infinite, just as the 
value of a pristine environment is not infinite. Pollution is a necessary by-product of most 
of the activities that sustain human life on this planet, or at least make that life more 
tolerable. In other words, a certain level of pollution yields benefits to society. Therefore, 
as one economist has stated, "the choice facing a rational society is not between clean air 
and dirty air, or between clear water and polluted water, but rather between various levels 
of dirt and pollution" .131 If society adopts a policy of pollution abatement, the aim must 
be to find an 'optimal' level of pollution abatement where the benefits of abatement exceed 
or equal the costs. Society should no longer abate pollution where further abatement would 
cost more than it is worth.132 
2 Obstacles to economic efficiency 
A variety of factors may impede the ability of persons to make an efficient decision as to 
whether to invest in pollution avoidance or risk liability for clean-up costs. 
( a) Transactions costs 
In the world of economic theory, transactions that promote efficiency occur without 
cost. In the real world, efficient allocations may be prevented because the costs of 
transactions may exceed the benefits that could otherwise have been gained by 
entering into them. 133 For example, individuals who lack perfect information or 
knowledge about the risks they face, will not be able to accurately estimate the costs 
of pollution in advance. As a result, they may make inefficient decisions. In 
addition, the process of negotiation itself may bar an efficient outcome. To 
131 Ruff in above n 127, 22. 
132 These statements implicitly rely on the economic concept of marginalism. According to this theory: 
"The standard economic problem [is] that of finding a level of operation of some activity 
which would maximise the net gain from that activity, where the net gain is the difference 
between the benefits and the costs of the activity. As the level of activity increases, both 
benefits and costs will increase; but because of diminishing returns, costs will increase 
faster than benefits. When a certain level of the activity is reached, any further expansion 
increases costs more than benefits. At this 'optimal' level, 'marginal cost' - or the cost of 
expanding the activity - equals 'marginal benefit', or the benefit from expanding the 
activity. Further expansion would cost more than it is worth, and reduction in the activity 
would reduce benefits more than it would save costs. The net gain is said to be maximised 
at this point." 
See Ruff in above n 127, 22. 
l33 Above n 124, 14. 
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illustrate, it is unfeasible for all downstream users of the river to unite together and 
negotiate with the factory owner to restrain its pollution. Alternatively, it is just as 
difficult for the factory owner to locate and compensate all homeowners for any 
damage in exchange for permission to continue dumping waste into the river. 
(b) Externalities 
(i) The effect of externalities 
An externality is a side effect of an individual's actions that is borne, not by 
the individual, but by others. It is a social cost, rather than a private 
cost. 134 To the economist, externalities, or the divergence between private 
and social costs, are the fundamental cause of pollution.135 For example, 
factories will dump waste into rivers if water is a free resource. In this 
scenario, the cost of dumping waste is not included in the factories' costs of 
production; it is externalized to society. Because the factories can avoid 
paying the full cost of the resource they consume, they have an incentive to 
consume excessive amounts of it. In turn, the price of goods produced by 
factories will not accurately reflect their true cost to society. Hence, 
consumer demand for the product will rise, and too many goods will be 
produced. This results in an inefficient allocation of resources and over-
utilisation of the environment. Each individual's incentives induce him or 
her to abuse environmental resources and invest less in protecting them than 
is socially desirable.136 
(ii) How to cure externalities 
The Coase Theorem demonstrates why, in the absence of transactions costs, 
externalities can be cured without legal intervention by the state. According 
to Coase, an efficient allocation of resources can be achieved by private 
bargaining between the parties. 137 In particular, assuming there are no 
134 See above n 127, 82; Ruff in above n 127, 23. 
135 Above n 127, 75; Ruff in above n 127, 23. 
136 See above n 127, 85; Trebilcock, above n 121, 367. Part of the environmental problem stems 
from the fact that environmental resources cannot be privately owned: they lack the property of 
'excludability'. The market, while able to secure the efficient use of things that are owned, cannot 
provide incentives for using public goods or common-property resources efficiently. The problem of 
public goods is classically illustrated by Garrett Hardin's example of the commons. See G Hardin "The 
Trgedy of the Commons" in above n 127. 
137 RH Coase "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) 3 J Law & Econ 1. See also B White "Coase 
and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man" (1987) 72 Iowa Law Rev 577; RD Cooter "Coase 
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transactions costs, the party imposing and the party suffering from the 
externality will negotiate to determine who should bear the costs and how 
the resource should ultimately be used. 
To illustrate, let us return to the example of the polluting factory. If 
downstream users of the river would benefit more from having a clean river 
than the polluter benefits from polluting, the users would pay the polluter to 
refrain from polluting. If having a clean river is not worth its cost, no 
payment would be made and the pollution would continue. In either case, 
economists believe the resources have been allocated efficiently. Similarly, 
even an inefficient legal rule could be circumvented contractually. If 
downstream users have a legal right to a clean river, then the polluter would 
compensate the users in exchange for the right to pollute, if the benefits of 
polluting outweighed the cost of compensation.138 
While Coase' s Theorem tells us that the initial allocation of property rights 
by the state is irrelevant to economic efficiency, this only holds true if 
transaction costs are nil. As transactions costs are greater then zero in 
reality, legal intervention to cure externalities and promote efficiency is 
therefore justified. 
Legal intervention will be effective, and will promote efficiency, if it 
manages to internalize externalities. In other words, it is necessary to adopt 
rules of liability that internalize the costs of pollution into the costs of all 
activities, thereby increasing the cost to the polluter of engaging in the 
activity. Holding polluters liable for pollution damage is one method of 
internalizing these costs. Once pollution costs include the costs of liability, 
incentives will change. When faced with a choice between onerous liability 
for clean-up costs and pollution prevention, polluters will reduce their costs 
by investing in the latter. Systems of liability that enable polluters to 
externalize the costs of liability in any way, will not promote efficiency. 
3 Distributive justice 
Many Law and Economics scholars stress the deterrent objectives of the legal system, and 
ignore the role of distributive justice in the legal system. However, achieving the efficient 
Theorem" in J Eat well, M Milgate and P Newman (eds) The World of Economics ( Macmillan Press, 
New York, 1987). 
l38 Above n 124, 17. 
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allocation of resources is by no means the only goal of environmental law. In the broadest 
sense the goal of any legal system is to achieve justice, and few would consider the single-
minded pursuit of efficiency a sufficient prescription for reaching that goal. Therefore, in 
addition to determining which distribution of risk or loss achieves the most efficient 
allocation of resources, it is proper to consider whether that distribution is fair. 
Drawing on notions of distributive justice, left wing writers and economists such as 
Calabresi argue that the costs of activities should be borne collectively and that any system 
of law should be evaluated against its capacity to spread risk and provide meaningful 
compensation. 139 In other words, the goal of distributive fairness can be accomplished 
through different forms of loss spreading or risk spreading. 
(a) Justificationfor loss spreading 
One justification for loss spreading lies in the theory of diminishing marginal utility 
of money. This theory holds that a loss causes less social and economic disruption 
if many people share it. For instance, people supposedly suffer less if 10,000 of 
them lose $1 each, than if one person loses $10,000. 140 Hence, from a purely 
utilitarian perspective, liability for clean-up costs may be less burdensome if it is 
spread broadly among many. 
Loss spreading may also be justifed where it is inequitable or unethical for one 
group or individual in society to bear all the risk they actually pose. It may be fairer 
or less discriminatory to allocate liability costs to other sectors of society. For 
example, it would be unethical to increase motor vehicle insurance premiums on the 
basis of a person's race, even if it could be proved that certain races caused 
disproportionately more car accidents than others. 
(b) Forms of loss spreading 
Loss spreading can be achieved in a number of ways. In the first place, losses can 
be spread through systems of private insurance or social insurance. The New 
Zealand accident compensation scheme is an example of such a social insurance 
system. The question of who would pay what taxes to establish the requisite 
pollution clean-up fund would depend on the degree of risk spreading sought. For 
example, one could aim for total loss spreading in which every member of society 
139 M Trebilcock, "The Future of Tort Law: Mapping the Contours of the Debate" (1989) 15 Can 
Bus L J 471. 
140 See Oswald, above n 6, 596; Calabresi, above n 121, 39-40. 
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contributed to the costs of pollution. Alternatively, one could adopt the 'deep 
pocket' form of risk spreading. This method advocates placing losses on those 
categories of persons least likely to suffer socio-economic dislocation as a result of 
bearing them, usually thought to be the wealthy.141 
A further way of spreading pollution losses is through enterprise liability. 
Enterprise liability holds that losses to society caused or created by an enterprise 
ought to be borne by that enterprise. 142 As enterprises are in a position to pass on 
the losses to purchasers of their product or service, this enables a fairly wide 
distribution of pollution costs. 
As the discussion above shows, there are virtually no limits on how society can 
allocate or divide these costs. Certainly, in determining the allocation of pollution 
costs, we are not limited to placing the burden of liability on the polluter. The 
'polluter pays' principle, although a currently fashionable concept, cannot be 
accepted as inherently determinative of who ought to bear the costs of pollution. 
4 Tensions between economic efficiency and distributive justice 
The goals of economic efficiency and distributive justice have quite different emphases. 
The goal of distributive justice concentrates on determining who will pay for the costs of 
pollution once it has already occurred. Concern with the financial consequences of a past 
event is backward-looking in perspective. By comparison, the goal of economic efficiency 
is concerned to prevent future acts of pollution that are not cost-justified. It aims to create 
incentives that will shape future conduct. 
At a more fundamental level, the goals not only emphasise different things, but are often 
incompatible with each other. Any society that aims to achieve a measure of distributive 
justice must often do so at the expense of economic efficiency. Conversely, political or 
legal decisions that promote efficiency may have social or moral outcomes that are 
unacceptable. In the words of Lord Atkin, "justice and efficiency are seldom on speaking 
terms".143 We should therefore not expect lender liability to fully satisfy both goals: what 
is important it that it is able to accommodate the two goals to the fullest extent possible. 
141 Calabresi, above n 121, 40. 
142 See Klemme, above n 119, 158; Calabresi, above n 121, 51. 
143 Ford v Blurton (1921) 381LR 804 at 805. 
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D Does Lender Liability Achieve These Goals ? 
The previous sections have established the goals that environmental law seeks to achieve: 
efficient allocation of resources and a just distribution of risk. This section will examine 
the extent to which a system of lender liability is capable of achieving these goals. This 
will require an analysis of the incentive effects and the distributional consequences of 
lender liability under the RMA. 
1 The incentive effects of lender liability 
( a) Realising the security 
It is important to bear in mind that local authorities under the RMA will probably 
seek, as a first resort, to place pollution costs on the polluter. It is only when the 
polluter cannot be identified or is insolvent that authorities will seek to impose 
liability on the owner or occupier of land. In turn, if a lender has not taken steps to 
realise its security, the lender will not constitute an owner or occupier and so will 
not incur liability. Only in the event that the borrower defaults and the lender 
enforces its security does the issue of lender liability arise. 
The threat of lender liability will therefore force banks and other mortgagees to 
engage in a cost-benefit analysis of whether to enforce its security and run the risk 
of attracting liability under the RMA, or whether to abandon the property altogether. 
If, for example, the value of the security is $1 million (or even less in light of the 
fact that the property is polluted), but the estimated cost of liability for remediation 
of that land is $1.5 million, the bank may choose to reduce its losses by abandoning 
the property. 
The decision to abandon would represent an efficient allocation of resources for the 
bank. It has chosen the lesser of the two losses. However, it is not a desirable or 
efficient result for society as a whole. If property is abandoned in a polluted state, 
the value of that resource is not maximised. If the state was determined to remediate 
the site, the costs of liability would have to be met by all taxpayers. In other words, 
the costs of liability would be externalized to society. Deterrence is not encouraged 
when the practical effect of placing liability on lenders is that society itself picks up 
the tab. Any system of liability that encourages owners to abandon land therefore 
does not promote efficiency. 
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However, lender liability need not have this effect. A lender does not act in its own 
best interests if it allows events to progress to the point where it is forced to choose 
between the lesser of the two evils of liability or abandonment. Rather, it is rational 
for a lender to take steps to ensure that the borrower complies with the RMA from 
the very beginning of the lending relationship so that a bank may safely realise its 
security in the event of borrower default. The fear of lender liability may therefore 
create incentives on the part of lenders to deter borrowers from polluting, as the 
following sections demonstrate. 
(b) Active risk management 
Lenders will have an incentive to take a much more active role in monitoring their 
customers' activities and managing the risks of polluting. Lenders will be forced to 
become surrogate regulators in order to shield themselves from liability. New 
Zealand banks, following the North American lead, will probably attempt to protect 
themselves by taking the following steps. 144 Prior to the inception of the loan, 
banks will need to undertake environmental risk assessments or 'audits'. These 
audits will include an inquiry into the previous uses and ownership of the property, 
review of historical records and present business practices, site inspections, and if 
necessary, soil analysis and sample testing for detection of any subsurface 
contamination. 145 Environmental questionnaires will provide useful means of 
obtaining representations and warrantees from the borrower as to the status of the 
borrower's property_ 146 
Once the loan has been authorised, the loan documentation will need to take account 
of environmental concerns and carefully define the borrower's responsibilities 
throughout the course of the loan. 147 For example, lenders will require covenants 
from borrowers that they will comply with environmental laws. Loan agreements 
should permit the lender access to the borrower's property at any time to check 
l44 For a description of the steps being taken by United States banks in repsonse to the perceived 
threat from CERCLA, see A Bryce "Environmental Liability: Practical Issues for Lenders" (1992) 4 
JIBL 131 and CM Ward "Environmental Risk Assessment" (1993) 110 BU 204. 
l45 C E Davidson "Environmental Considerations In Loan Documentation" (1989) 106 BLJ 308, 
315. These steps are already being taken in the United States in response to the perceived threat created 
by CERCLA. Environmental investigations in that country are divided up into Phase I and II audits 
involving site inspections, records review, interviews with regulatory authorities and extensive soil 
testing and analysis. See Bryce, above n 144, 135; Ward, above n 144, 212. 
146 Davidson, above n 145, 317. 
147 Ward, above nl44, 209. 
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compliance. 148 The agreement should also require borrowers to undertake periodic 
site assessment and remediation. 
Direct risk management activities of the sort described in the preceding paragraphs 
require sanctions for non-compliance in order to be effective. In this regard, 
lenders are able to impose severe penalties. For example, failure to pass pre-loan 
audits could result in the denial of finance. Non-compliance with environmental 
laws during the term of the loan could trigger punitive interest rates or could 
constitute grounds for demanding immediate repayment of the loan. The threat of 
these penalties will place borrowers under constant pressure to install environmental 
compliance programmes and avoid activities that lead to adverse environmental 
effects. In other words, because of lenders' unparalleled ability to influence and 
constrain their borrowers' behaviour, lender liability may have extremely efficient 
deterrent effects. Arguably, no other party is in a better position to force polluters 
to refrain from polluting. 
However, there are significant costs involved in active risk management. Banks 
will need to spend a great deal of time and money building up an expertise in 
environmental matters. Environmental risk assessment will need to be undertaken 
by an internal department of environmental specialists or external consulting firms: 
either will be expensive. The cost of screening all potential borrowers will also be 
significant.149 
Ironically, lenders' attempts to protect themselves from one form of legal liability 
may expose them to others. Active risk management requires banks to play an 
authoritarian role in making decisions about the way their customers conduct their 
businesses. Therefore, as a lender's involvement in a borrower's business 
increases, so too does the risk of liability under section 340(3) of the RMA as a 
'person concerned in the management of a body corporate'. In addition, the courts 
may apply doctrines of undue influence, unconscionability, and duress to punish 
lenders who impose onerous or unduly restrictive lending terms on borrowers. 
Lenders will therefore have to weigh carefully the costs and benefits of adopting a 
policy of active 1isk management. 
148 Ibid. 
l49 Some New Zealand bankers fear that the potential scope of environmental credit risk is so wide 
that practically all potential borrowers, including residential mortgagors, would require screening. X 
Harding "Should Banks Police the Environment?" (1992) 5 New Zealand Banker 17, 18. 
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( c) Risk classification 
It may not be enough for banks to monitor and attempt to influence their customers' 
behaviour. Site contamination may occur despite the best efforts of borrowers or 
lenders. Lenders will therefore be forced to take measures to cushion the impact of 
liability costs by distributing or spreading losses among its customers. In this 
sense, they will be forced to become insurers of risk. 
Insurers protect against risk by dividing insureds into risk classes and varying the 
prices charged for coverage according to the expected loss (probability of a loss 
multiplied by the magnitude of the loss if it occurs) of each class of insureds. 150 
Accurate risk classification and pricing will promote economically efficient 
behaviour by encouraging insureds to compare the cost of insurance with the cost of 
investing in loss prevention, and thereby reduce the sum of the two costs.1 51 
Inaccurate pricing or classification results in inefficient allocations of resources: if 
insurance is too cheap, insureds. will under allocate to loss prevention, and vice-
versa. Insufficient classification can therefore allow insureds to externalize the 
costs of liability to other insureds. Hence, the incentive effects produced by a 
refined as opposed to a blunt insurance pricing system may vary considerably. The 
deterrent properties of insurance are therefore dependant on accurate risk 
classification and pricing. 
These principles will apply equally to lenders if they attempt to spread risk. Banks 
will build the risk of liability costs into the cost of lending by, for example, raising 
interest rates or bank charges. Lenders will encourage cost internalization on the 
part of borrowers if they can accurately classify borrowers according to their 
expected loss. For example, high-risk customers should pay higher interest rates 
than customers that represent a low risk. Banks should classify risk on the basis of 
variables within the borrower's control, so as to create loss prevention incentives. 
For example, borrowers could be charged according to their businesses' levels of 
activity, use of toxic substances, or according to the liability they have incurred in 
the past. An increase in interest rates will serve as a signal to the borrower to 
allocate more to loss prevention, while a decrease will reward loss prevention 
efforts. 
150 Above n 124, 2 and 15. 
151 Above n 124, 65-66. 
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However, there are two reasons why banks are at risk of creating inaccurate or 
insufficient risk classes. First, unlike the insurance industry, bankers have little 
experience in risk assessment and classification. Knowledge of the methods and 
effects of risk classification is likely to be woefully insufficient.152 The cost of 
acquiring and interpreting data to define risk classes may therefore exceed the 
advantages of classification. l53 
Second, the task of classification is made more difficult by the problems inherent in 
predicting the costs of liability for remediating pollution.15
4 According to Kenneth 
Abraham: 155 
The amount of damage that current and past uses of toxic substances ultimately will 
cause cannot be predicted. Scientific uncertainty is one reason; knowledge of the 
hazardous properties of toxic chemicals is in its infancy. The synergistic effect of 
chemicals that have been mixed together during storage in waste dumps are even less 
clear. . .. And toxic disasters tend to be catastrophic in scope and sporadic in 
occurrence. All this makes it very difficult to predict the ultimate riskiness of 
activities involving toxic substances. 
The banking industry is not alone in suffering from an acute lack of quantitative 
information about the dangers of toxic chemicals. However, the absence of 
detailed, reliable data will hinder lenders' efforts to evaluate the riskiness of their 
customers' activities and set interest rates accordingly. In tum, inaccurate risk 
classification will create the wrong incentives for borrowers. Under these 
circumstances, there is little reason for confidence that lender liability will result in 
an efficient allocation of resources. Instead, imposition of lender liability creates an 
atmosphere of uncertainty, where it is difficult to plot a course of action which is 
guaranteed to minimise the risk of financial loss.156 
( d) Conservative lending policies 
As a result of the uncertainty generated, lender liability will encourage lenders to 
adopt a more conservative approach to commercial and industrial lending. 
152 Banking Law Association, Banking Law and Practice 8th Annual Conference, 9-10 May 1991, 
Auckland, New Zealand, 201-202. 
153 Above n 124, 15. 
154 For example, the costs of remediating a service station range from approximately $20,000 to 
$200,000. See Glen Smith, above n 10, 65. 
155 Above n 124, 47. 
156 E Welch and T Parker "A Bank's View of Lender Liability in Environmental Legislation" (1993) 
6 JIBL 217,219. 
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Businesses engaged in environmentally sensitive activities will experience difficulty 
in obtaining loans. 
This phenomenon has already occurred in the United States, where as a result of the 
vagaries of CERCLA liability, some lenders have made policy determinations to 
cease lending to entire industries. Chemical manufacturers, for example, have had 
difficulty in obtaining finance. 157 The American insurance crisis of the mid-1980s 
was partially attributable to the impact of environmental liability. Insurers slashed 
levels of coverage provided; premiums rose dramatically; and reinsurers such as 
Lloyds of London retreated from the United States market, claiming "the liability 
insurance scene in the U.S. has lost all predictability and therefore has become 
impossible to assess in terms of premium rates". 158 By 1986, most of the 
country's 400 largest consulting engineering firms were unable to buy pollution 
liability insurance in any amount or at any price. 159 The effects have been lasting. 
A 1991 survey indicated that only three United States insurers were still offering 
substantial domestic hazardous waste insurance coverage. 160 
Conservative lending policies such as those mentioned above will have serious 
repercussions for New Zealand commerce and foreign investment in New Zealand. 
While it may seem to be a positive development to withhold finance from 
environmentally unsound businesses, it will also deny them the funds necessary to 
implement pollution avoidance measures. Poor businesses, like poor countries, can 
often be the worst polluters. 
( e) Increased litigation 
Perhaps the most likely, and the most damaging result of lender liability, will be the 
increase in litigation. Lenders are likely to challenge any attempts by local 
authorities to create a precedent for the imposition of liability for clean-up costs on 
lenders. Allocation of resources to litigation may be cost-effective for lenders if 
litigation guarantees lenders will avoid liability and it is cheaper than both pollution 
avoidance costs and pollution costs. If however, litigation is unsuccessful, lenders 
have incurred not only liability costs but legal costs as well. Either way, such 
157 Ward, above n 144, 208. 
158 Lloyds insurers quoted in PW Huber Liability: The Legal Revolution and its Consequences 
(Basic Books Inc, New York, 1988), 141. See also S Saul & S Janissen "Contaminated Site Clean-
up: Is Superfund the Answer?" (1994) 1 Butterworths Resource Management Bulletin 18, 20. 
159 Huber, above n 158, 140. 
l60 Above n 6, 340. 
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litigation is counterproductive and inefficient for society as a whole. It absorbs 
resources that could be allocated more productively toward either pollution 
prevention or remediation. 
The North American experience reveals the inefficiencies of litigation. In the United 
States, billions of dollars have been spent by government and the private sector on 
the clean-up of fewer than 85 sites. The greater proportion of that money has been 
spent in defending or pursuing legal action in relation to clean-up orders.161 The 
average cost of remediating a site on the National Priorities List is between US$25 
million and US$31 million; nearly 30 percent of that cost represents litigation 
costs. 162 As a result of legal wrangling, the typical time between identifying and 
remediating a contaminated site can be as long as 15 years.163 
(f) Summary 
To summarise this section, lender liability is capable of creating incentive effects 
that promote efficiency. In particular, lenders are able to induce modifications in the 
behaviour of their customers that could result in a reduction of the sum of the costs 
of pollution and pollution avoidance. On the other hand, lenders may be 
encouraged to abandon their security, adopt overly conservative lending policies, or 
engage in futile litigation. Even genuine attempts to respond to the risks presented 
by lender liability may inadvertently lead to inefficiency where, for example, banks 
classify and spread risk inaccurately. The RMA' s regime of lender liability 
therefore achieves only a measure of success in accomplishing the goal of 
efficiency. If the results of lender liability are not wholly efficient, are they at least 
distributively fair ? 
2 The distributional effects of lender liability 
( a) Achievement of loss spreading 
Lender liability is clearly successful in spreading losses. There is, in effect, a 
double layer of loss spreading involved in lender liability: first, losses are shifted 
from the polluter to its lender; and second, those costs are passed on to all of the 
161 Welch and Parker, above n 156, 218. 
162 Above n 4, 314; Saul and Janissen, above n 158, 20. 
163 Saul and Janissen, above n 158, 20. Lawyers' fees in one trial alone can amount to US$11 
million. See D Sive "Liability for Contaminated Sites: Superfund and its Problems" (1994) 1 NZELR 
45. 
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lender's customers through the lender's pricing mechanisms. Losses that otherwise 
would have fallen on one party alone, possibly causing extreme financial 
dislocation, are shared among many. 
A rationale behind a system of lender liability is that losses will be spread and 
allocated on the basis of 'deep pockets'. Losses are absorbed by institutions which 
supposedly have a revenue base large enough to cushion the impact of liability. 
However, this method of risk spreading can be problematic. In the first place, it 
assumes that lenders do indeed have 'deep pockets'. However, not all secured 
creditors are large and powerful multinational banks or finance corporations: many 
are individuals or small institutions which are vulnerable to losses of this nature. 
Second, if the state aims to spread pollution costs on the basis of deep pockets, 
why not place those costs on any or all banks ? If the crucial variable was wealth, 
one would not impose liability only on those lenders whose borrowers pollute; any 
bank would suffice. Third, if the state was committed to spreading pollution costs 
thinly, there would be no logical stopping point short of rendering the state, as the 
deepest pocket, liable for all pollution costs. Such an option would certainly be 
more administratively convenient.164 
(b) Is this distribution of loss fair? 
It is not enough to query whether lender liability achieves a distribution of losses: 
one must then examine whether that particular distribution or allocation is equitable. 
In many ways, lender liability has quite unfair distributional effects. 
( i) No causative link between lenders and pollution 
The most obvious objection to the distribution of risk under lender liability 
is that it places liability costs on parties whose activities were not 
responsible for creating the pollution in the first place. As this paper has 
shown, the law generally considers that losses should be borne by the party 
who has created a risk or acted culpably. Lenders have done neither. 
But are lenders completely without culpability in this scenario ? One can 
argue that even if lenders do not cause the pollution themselves, they derive 
financial benefits from lending to businesses which engage in polluting 
activities. They rely on borrowers to do whatever is necessary, including 
l64 Calabresi, above n 121, 46. 
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contaminating the environment, to meet interest payments and repay their 
debt to the bank. It may therefore be fair for lenders to take responsibility 
for what occurs on borrowers' property. In the words of the Senate 
Commission on Environment and Public Works: 165 
[S]ociety should not bear the costs of protecting the public from hazards 
produced in the past by a generator, transporter, consumer, or dumpsite 
owner or operator who has profited or otherwise benefited from commerce 
involving these substances and now wishes to be insulated from any 
continuing responsibilities for the present hazards to society that have been 
created . ... Relieving industry of responsibility establishes a precedent 
seriously adverse to the public interest. 
However, this argument is not entirely convincing. In the broadest sense, 
all of society benefits from activities that lead to contamination, because 
such activities produce goods, generate employment and wealth in the 
community. One commentator has argued that: 166 
it could under some circumstances be an entirely rational posture for a 
legislature to suggest that because the benefits attendant on the industrialised 
and agricultural activities which bad created the contamination in the first 
place were so widely disseminated across the society as a whole, that the 
sensible way in which to finance remediation of the environment was 
simply to do so out of the general tax revenues. 
In other words, whether or not someone gains a benefit from an activity is 
not necessarily determinative of the issue. 
( ii) Arbitrariness 
There are further objections to the distributive effects of lender liability. 
This form of liability operates in an arbitrary fashion. For example, bank A 
and bank B may both have borrowers who have caused site contamination. 
Bank A will only find itself directly liable under the RMA to pay clean-up 
costs if its borrower has defaulted and it has taken steps to recover its 
security. Bank B will remain sheltered from direct liability if its borrower 
remains solvent, because local authorities will impose direct liability on the 
borrower instead. In other words, liability depends not on the nature of the 
pollution or the parties' behaviour, but on the financial well-being of the 
165 Quoted in Oswald, above n 6, 601. 
166 Rabinowitz in Banking Law Association, Banking Law and Practice 8th Annual Conference, 9-10 
May 1991, Auckland, New Zealand, 199. 
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polluter. Determining responsibility in this method flies in the face of the 
principle that like cases should be treated alike. 
( iii) Inequitable results for innocent borrowers 
Finally, distribution of risk to a bank's general customers is inequitable if 
low-risk customers are forced to subsidize high-risk customers. As a matter 
of fairness, people whose expected loss is minimal should not have to bear 
the burdens of inaccuracy. 167 Yet as this paper has shown, there is every 
likelihood of this occurring if banks lack the information necessary for 
accurate risk classification. In this scenario, failure to allocate resources 
efficiently is morally and well as economically objectionable. 
(c) Summary 
The preceding discussion indicates that lender liability results in inequitable 
distributions of loss or risk. If this form of liability is unsuccessful in achieving the 
goal of distributive justice, and is only partially successful in achieving the goal of 
economic efficiency, then it becomes difficult to justify its adoption as a legal rule 
of liability. In other words, analysis of the concept of lender liability through a 
Law and Economics framework points to the conclusion that the imposition on 
lenders of liability for remediation of contaminated sites does not accord with legal 
principle. 
VI CONCLUSION 
This paper began with a conundrum: can lenders be held liable for the environmentally 
unsound activities of their borrowers, and if so, should they be ? The paper first 
established that several provisions in the RMA have the potential to impose direct 
liability for the costs of cleaning up pollution on lenders who take steps to realise their 
security and thereby become owners or occupiers. Lenders in the role of owners or 
occupiers have never before been held liable in New Zealand for the actions of others. 
However, if New Zealand courts follow the approach of foreign jurisdictions, they are 
likely to impose such liability on lenders in the future. 
Having demonstrated that lenders could face liability under the RMA, the paper then 
focused on the question of whether the concept of lender liability could be justified as a 
l 67 Above n 124, 85. Lfo.'./ L :- ' 
~lGTORiA UNIVER31 TY v, 
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matter of principle or policy. The paper adopted a Law and Economics analysis which 
identified the goals of environmental law as being the efficient allocation of resources 
and a fair distribution of loss. It then examined whether the legal rule of lender liability 
achieved these goals. The paper found that the incentive and distributional effects of 
lender liability were generally inefficient and unjust. This result means that lender 
liability cannot be justified as a matter of legal principle or economic policy, as it does 
not satisfy the goals it was designed to achieve. 
In conclusion therefore, decision makers need to consider amending sections 
314(l)(da) and 322(l)(b)(ii) of the RMA, so as to exclude the possibility of lender 
liability. Failure to do so will hinder the achievement of the goals of environmental 
law. 
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